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I. Introduction 
Since October 30, 2006, blender manufacturer and seller 
Blendtec has advertised its products on the internet by positing a 
largely rhetorical question: Will It Blend?1 The premise is 
ingeniously (and humorously) simple: Blendtec founder and CEO 
Tom Dickson shows firsthand the power of his company’s 
blenders by blending unconventional items, from toy cars2 to cans 
of soup.3 In a 2014 episode, the featured item was a brand new 
iPhone 6 Plus.4 The video proved popular,5 but reactions, 
unsurprisingly, were mixed. Some skeptics remained 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Christian Briggs, BlendTec Will It Blend? Viral Video Case Study, 
SOCIALENS (Jan. 2009), http://www.socialens.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2009/04/20090127_case_blendtec11.pdf (“In 2006, Blendtec’s relatively new 
Director of Marketing launched a viral video campaign in which the company’s 
CEO blended up various non-food items in Blendtec blenders.”). 
 2. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – Toy Cars, YOUTUBE (Dec. 19, 2006), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNbzmdYRRmg (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – Cup of Soup, YOUTUBE (Dec. 26, 2006), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3OmpnfL5PCw (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. Blendtec, Will it Blend? – iPhone 6 Plus, YOUTUBE (Sept. 23, 2014), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBUJcD6Ws6s (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. As of January 28, 2017, the video had 5,566,676 views. Id. 
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unconvinced that the blended iPhone was real,6 some appreciated 
the humor,7 and some expressed, with varying degrees of clarity, 
outrage at the sight of Mr. Dickson quite literally reducing a 
piece of technology worth hundreds of dollars to dust.8 Of course, 
these responses were largely visceral. They are, however, fairly 
representative of the intellectual climate surrounding the 
property right underlying Blendtec’s attempt to promote its 
products: the much-maligned right to destroy.9 
Though traditionally recognized as a fundamental property 
right,10 the right to destroy has in recent decades come under 
attack.11 Congress has restricted the right with respect to artistic 
creations,12 courts have carved out several public policy 
exceptions to the exercise of the right,13 and some commentators 
have called for either its partial or total abrogation, primarily on 
the basis of waste.14 The right has few defenders; to the extent it 
                                                                                                     
 6. One YouTube user, “Maria Ammerlaan,” commented: “You can clearly 
tell the iphone is a fake.” Id. 
 7.  For instance, a YouTube user going by the handle “Ds Vic” considered 
the video the “[b]est thing [he’d] seen this year,” adding: “LOL.” Id. 
 8.  “CocoCheryl GT,” for example, asked: “why watse a perfectly good 
iphone???? i wuld be playing instead of crushing it. stop. nov body thinks this is 
entertainment. its just a waste of time and money [sic]!!!” Id. “Carter Stanley,” 
however, had a milder reaction: “I love your videos. I just get kinda angry when 
u blend really expensive stuff [sic].” Id. 
 9. See generally Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE 
L.J. 781 (2005) (discussing arguments against and justifications for the right to 
destroy). 
 10. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 1.03(B)(5) 
(2012) [hereinafter SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY] (including the right 
to destroy among the “bundle of rights” afforded by property law). 
 11. See infra Part II.C (discussing actual and proposed limits on the right 
to destroy). 
 12. See Visual Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting “the 
author of a work of visual art . . . the right . . . to prevent any intentional 
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work”). 
 13. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., N.A., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217–
18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (refusing to enforce a will providing that the testator’s 
home would be destroyed upon her death). 
 14. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in 
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76, 77 (Stephen 
R. Munzer ed., 2001) (arguing “against the continuance of the” right to destroy 
on the ground that it does not mesh with Anglo-American values); Kellen Zale, 
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is not challenged the right to destroy has been largely forgotten, 
sparsely receiving scholarly attention.15 Even Black’s Law 
Dictionary has seemingly swept the right to destroy under the 
rug.16 
This treatment might make some sense within the realm of 
tangible property, especially real property, the context in which 
the right is usually challenged.17 After all, why should we, as a 
society of finite resources, tolerate the destruction of some of 
these resources at the whim of their owners? But property 
evolves. What was once physical can now be digital.18 And digital 
property, though once primarily stored on local memory drives, is 
now often stored on “the cloud”—that is, on servers maintained 
by third-parties—meaning that they can be accessed through any 
device with internet connectivity.19 When it comes to such 
                                                                                                     
The Government’s Right to Destroy, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 269, 316–17 (2015) 
(concluding that the government ought to have a broader right to destroy than 
private citizens). 
 15. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (noting that “few scholars devoted 
much attention to the right to destroy” compared to “the right to exclude, the 
right to alienate, the right to use, the right to testamentary disposition, the 
right to mortgage, and the like”). 
 16. See Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “owner” 
as one “who has the right to possess, use, and convey something”). Prior to the 
1999 seventh edition, Black’s Law Dictionary defined “owner” more broadly to 
include the “right to enjoy and do with [his property] as he pleases, even to spoil 
or destroy it, as far as the law permits.” Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 
(quoting Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 17.  See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 796 (“[T]he most prominent set of 
cases prompting concerns about waste involve efforts by landowners to destroy 
their homes via will.”). 
 18. See, e.g., RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not 
Apply to Digital Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADV. 31, 32 n.1 (2007) 
(defining “digital property” as the “digital data contained on computers and 
other electronic storage devices”). 
 19. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE 
NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD COMPUTING: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2 (2011), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy /SP/nistspecialpublication800-145.pdf 
(noting that one of the “essential characteristics” of cloud-maintained data is 
that it can be “accessed through standard mechanisms that promote use 
by . . . mobile phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations”). 
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property, the problem is not ensuring preservation but confirming 
destruction.20 
Storing our files—videos, songs, games, and documents—on 
the cloud offers unprecedented convenience.21 Convenience, 
however, has its costs. The rapid adoption of cloud-based storage 
services threatens two related but distinct aspects of property 
ownership: control and peace of mind.22 The right to destroy once 
arguably served to protect these interests: it (1) allowed the 
property owner to have exclusive say in the ultimate fate of her 
property and (2) gave the property owner complete certainty that 
no other would, or could, use the property.23 By contrast, in the 
world of the cloud, control is shared with a third-party24 and 
certainty is displaced by faith.25  
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Part V.A–B (discussing the resiliency of electronic data). 
 21. See DARREN QUICK ET AL., CLOUD STORAGE FORENSICS 1–2 (2013) 
(discussing the “marked increase in the adoption of cloud computing”); Kevin 
McGillivray, Conflicts in the Cloud: Contracts and Compliance with Data 
Protection Law in the EU, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 217, 218 (2014) 
(“Cloud computing allows businesses, governments, and consumers to outsource 
their computing needs in an efficient and cost-effective manner.”). Indeed, this 
very Note has been stored on Google Drive throughout the entire writing 
process. 
 22. See, e.g., JOSHUA A.T. FAIRFIELD, OWNED: PROPERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE 
NEW DIGITAL SERFDOM (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter FAIRFIELD, OWNED] 
(manuscript at 9) (on file with author) (“We recognize instinctively that property 
represents our ability to control the world around us.”); Richard A. Posner, 
Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classical Liberalism, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 664 
(2004) (discussing the view of equating “the right to own property” with “the 
right, in effect, to own one’s body and one’s peace of mind”); see also infra Part 
IV (discussing how these problems arise in the context of cloud-maintained 
digital property). 
 23. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794–95 (discussing the justifications 
for recognizing the right to destroy and noting that “we might understand the 
right to destroy as an extreme right to control subsequent alienation”). 
 24. See McGillivray, supra note 21, at 220 (noting that cloud users store 
data “on servers over which they have little or no control”). 
 25. See CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BEST PRACTICES FROM A CONSUMER 
FEDERATION OF THE US RETREAT ON CLOUD COMPUTING 9 (2010), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Cloud-report-2010.pdf (“A 2008 Pew Internet 
& American Life Project report elucidated consumers’ biggest concerns about 
cloud services . . . . Sixty‐three percent would be very concerned if the cloud 
provider kept files after the consumer attempted to delete them.”). 
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Perhaps a hypothetical would help to illustrate the point. In 
1975, a photographer displeased with her photograph need only 
burn it to exercise her right to destroy. She could see and smell 
and sift through the ashes, and know that her right to destroy 
had been successfully exercised. In 2000, a photographer 
displeased with her digital image need only delete the file and 
overwrite the storage device (or, for 100% certainty, smash it into 
pieces).26 She too could confirm the success of her destructive act. 
Will this pattern hold for the year 2025?27 Probably not, because 
the owner of digital property maintained on the cloud will be able 
to use only whatever deletion mechanism her cloud storage 
service provides and hope that her wishes are fulfilled.28 It may 
appear to her that the file has disappeared, as commanded.29 She 
cannot, however, be sure that it is gone.30 After all, the cloud 
storage provider may be secretly keeping the file for itself.31 Or 
                                                                                                     
 26. See Jason Krause, Guarding the Cyberfort, 89 A.B.A. J. 42, 46 (2003) 
(discussing programs used for “destroying data”). According to an expert, “[t]he 
only way to completely erase a hard drive is to take it out of the computer and 
smash it with a hammer.” Id. 
 27. Of course, we do not know what the year 2025 will hold, but “[m]any in 
the tech industry see the cloud as the definitive future of digital storage.” Alen 
Peacock, What Cloud Storage’s Changing Forecast Means for Your Data, FORBES 
(June 4, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2015/06/04/what-cloud-
storages-changing-forecast-means-for-your-data (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Daniel J. Gervais & Daniel J. Hyndman, Cloud Computing: Cloud 
Control: Copyright, Global Memes and Privacy, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 53, 79 (2012) (noting that it is “up to the user . . . to trust that the 
provider will delete her information”); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234 (“Once 
information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, 
to control, track, or delete.”). 
 29. See, e.g., Delete Files in Dropbox, DROPBOX HELP CTR., 
http://www.dropbox.com/en/help/40 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (instructing users 
how to delete their files stored on Dropbox’s servers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 30. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the uncertainty facing users of cloud 
services). 
 31. Returning to Dropbox, its terms of service contain the following 
provision: 
We’ll retain information you store on our Services for as long as we 
need it to provide you the Services. If you delete your account, we’ll 
also delete this information. But please note: (1) there might be some 
latency in deleting this information from our servers and back-up 
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perhaps the digital property exists elsewhere, in one form or 
another.32 The bottom line is that the peace of mind once 
generated by the inherent finality of an act protected by the right 
to destroy is absent—lost, as it were, in the clouds.33  
This Note argues that the increasing prevalence of cloud 
computing provides a new context for reexamining, and a new 
justification for reaffirming, the right to destroy.34 Part II 
discusses the origin and development of the right to destroy and 
the current state of the right within American property law’s 
“bundle of rights.”35 Part III begins with an overview of digital 
property generally and then examines in more detail the nature 
of cloud computing, specifically cloud storage.36 Part IV explains 
why the inability to delete cloud-maintained data is a problem.37 
Finally, Part V answers some of the criticisms levied at the right 
to destroy by showing their inapplicability to digital property and 
describes this Note’s suggested approach to reclaiming the right 
to destroy in the world of the cloud.38 
                                                                                                     
storage; and (2) we may retain this information if necessary to comply 
with our legal obligations, resolve disputes, or enforce our 
agreements. 
Dropbox Privacy Policy, DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com/privacy (last updated 
Oct. 3, 2016) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 32. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 71 (“While information 
stored on a personal computer is at risk and evanescent, once firmly rooted in 
the Cloud, information is much harder to delete.”). 
 33. See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (discussing the 
underlying benefits of the right to destroy and the threat the cloud storage 
model poses to these benefits). 
 34. For an excellent defense (and one of the few exhaustive treatments) of 
the right to destroy in a more traditional context, see generally Strahilevitz, 
supra note 9. 
 35. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the history of the right to 
destroy, its development in the case law, and its treatment by scholars). 
 36. See infra Part III (discussing competing definitions of digital property 
and cloud computing and why people began using cloud storage services). 
 37. See infra Part IV (arguing that the cloud storage model interferes with 
a property owner’s control over her property and thereby diminishes the peace 
of mind property rights have traditionally provided to owners).  
 38. See infra Part V (providing both a theoretical and practical solution to 
maintaining control over digital property stored in the cloud). 
474 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467 (2017) 
II. The Origin and Development of the Right to Destroy 
A. Ancient Roots 
The right to destroy cannot be found in any modern code or 
constitution; it is instead “implicitly recognized in all legal 
systems.”39 This was not always so. Millennia ago, the law of 
Ancient Rome expressly provided property owners with very 
broad rights: “jus utendi fruendi abutendi.”40 In English, this 
phrase encompasses “the rights to use the [property,] . . . to use 
the income generated by the property, or to completely consume 
and destroy the property.”41 It is thus within this absolutist view 
of property ownership that the right to destroy finds its roots.42 
The Romans probably did not have any special preference for 
destruction.43 The most likely explanation for the jus abutendi is 
that it necessarily justified “lesser” property rights.44 In other 
words, if an owner had the right to destroy her property, it 
followed that the owner had the right to use, sell, give, devise, or 
exclude that property from other persons.45 This makes a great 
deal of sense. The right to destroy probably was, as it seems 
                                                                                                     
 39. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY 293 (2014) 
[hereinafter SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
 40. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787. 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
 42. See Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 13 CALIF. L. 
REV. 207, 209 (1925) (noting that a Roman had the right “of completely 
consuming [his property] and therefore ending its effective existence”); 
Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787–88 (discussing the origins of the right to 
destroy in Roman law). 
 43. Indeed, although Roman law generally recognized the right to destroy, 
it limited the right in certain classes of property: “slaves and land.” Radin, supra 
note 42, at 210. 
 44. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785 (noting that “the right to 
destroy . . . served the important function of demarcating the boundaries of an 
owner’s rights in property”). 
 45. See id. at 788 (“A few early American courts picked up the notion of the 
jus abutendi and . . . suggested that if a landowner had the right to destroy 
property, he certainly had the right to use or dispose of it in a less dramatic 
manner.”). 
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today, largely symbolic.46 A property owner does not typically 
desire to actually destroy her valuable property.47  
This characteristic, however, does not diminish the 
importance of, or the need for, the right to destroy. The jus 
abutendi provided security to Roman property owners, 
guaranteeing to them that they, and no other, had control over 
their property, that the ultimate fate of the property was in their 
hands.48 Although Anglo-American concepts of property and 
property ownership have certainly changed since the time of the 
Roman Empire,49 this principle underlying Roman law’s 
recognition of the right to destroy is just as relevant today as it 
was millennia ago.50 
                                                                                                     
 46. See Radin, supra note 42, at 210 (observing that “it may be seen that 
the [j]us utendi fruendi abutendi, by virtue of its climactic arrangement, is 
rather an analysis of the idea of ownership than a real statement of what the 
elements of Roman dominium actually were” (emphasis added)). 
 47. As to why this is the case, Professor Strahilevitz succinctly articulates 
the obvious: “A new homeowner is more likely to want to exclude outsiders from 
his home than he is to want to raze it.” Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794. On the 
other hand, property that we routinely destroy is typically disposed of without 
controversy. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293–94 
(2014) (noting that many “things subject to ownership will be destroyed as part 
of a consumptive process that benefits their owners”). 
 48. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (viewing the right to destroy as an 
“extreme exercise of some of the more widely recognized sticks in the bundle of 
rights”). 
 49. For instance, Roman law knew nothing of intellectual property. See 
John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 685, 710 (2002) (“Legal protection of inventions (or, for that matter, 
other categories of intellectual property) simply did not exist in Roman or 
Hellenistic law.”). Moreover, only certain classes of people in Ancient Rome were 
capable of owning property. See, e.g., A. H. F. Lefroy, Rome and Law, 20 HARV. 
L. REV. 606, 609 (1907) (noting that “all the members of the family being left 
under the despotic control of the head of the family, [they were] . . . incapable of 
acquiring or owning property in their own right and on their own behalf”). 
 50. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the relationship between property 
rights and control over property). 
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B. At Common Law 
As with much of our jurisprudence,51 American property 
law’s counterpart to the jus abutendi—the right to destroy—
descends from the common law of England.52 If one were to rely 
solely on the writings of the famous English jurist Sir William 
Blackstone,53 one might conclude that English common law 
enshrined property rights above all others. To him, the “right of 
property” was “that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total 
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”54 
Like the Romans before him, Blackstone viewed property 
rights as absolute.55 It is therefore not surprising that Blackstone 
(and English law) recognized the right to destroy.56 This is most 
obvious in Blackstone’s discussion of the crime of arson, where 
the right to destroy is implicitly recognized.57 In his fervent way 
                                                                                                     
 51. See, e.g., ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL 
AND CRIMINAL CASES, AND A TREATISE ON BILLS OF EXCHANGES AND PROMISSORY 
NOTES vii (1810) (“[O]ur progenitors brought [the common law] with them from 
England, and made it, by adoption, their own, as much as the language they 
spoke.”). 
 52. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787–91 (tracing the history of the 
right to destroy from Rome to England and finally to the United States). 
 53. See generally Sir William Blackstone, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Apr. 
7, 2008), http://www.britannica.com/biography/William-Blackstone (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017) (providing a biography of William Blackstone) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 55. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35 (“So great 
moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize 
the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole 
community.”). The evidence suggests his writings were representative of English 
common law. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (3d ed. 2008) (noting that 
“Blackstone’s Commentaries were widely studied as a summary of English law”). 
 56. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223–24 (explaining that “if 
a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit whatever waste 
his own indiscretion may prompt to, without being impeachable or accountable 
for it to any one”). 
 57. See, e.g., Paul Jr. Sadler, The Crime of Arson, 41 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 290, 291 (1950) (discussing the connection between an owner’s 
right to destroy her property and the restriction of arson to the malicious 
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of speaking, Blackstone decried the crime as “an offense of very 
great malignity, and much more pernicious to the public than 
simple theft.”58 Yet he acknowledged that a property owner was 
entirely free to burn down her own house, subject to limited 
exceptions.59  
Likewise, American common law tended to view property 
ownership in absolute terms.60 For instance, the first edition of 
Black’s Law Dictionary, published in the late nineteenth 
century, defined property as “the unrestricted and exclusive 
right to a thing.”61 Although disputes regarding the right to 
destroy are relatively uncommon,62 a few early American cases 
discussed and recognized the right.63 Courts implicitly 
recognized the right to destroy in the arson context,64 mirroring 
England’s treatment of the crime.65 More directly, the court in 
United States v. Vanranst66 explained that an “owner 
might destroy his own property himself, or cause it to be done, 
without committing an offence.”67 Another court, in Kingsbury v. 
                                                                                                     
burning of “the dwelling of another”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788 (“The 
common law’s purported embrace of the jus abutendi is more precisely indicated 
in Blackstone’s discussion of arson.”). 
 58. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220. 
 59. See id. at *221–22 (noting that, “if no mischief is done but to one’s own 
[property], it does not amount to felony,” unless the owner-arsonist is leasing 
the property to a tenant). 
 60. See, e.g., Daniel Raymond, Law Reform in Regard to Real Estate, 3 W. 
L.J. 385, 390 (1846) (acknowledging “that a man’s right to property, to which he 
has acquired a legal title, is absolute and unqualified”). 
 61. Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) (emphasis added). 
 62. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining why there are so 
few cases challenging the right to destroy compared to other property rights). 
 63. See infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
invoking the right to destroy). 
 64. See, e.g., Bloss v. Tobey, 19 Mass. 320, 325 (Mass. 1824) (finding that 
destroying one’s property by fire, “unaccompanied by an injury to, or by a design 
to injure, some other person, is [not] criminal”). 
 65. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (discussing Blackstone’s 
views on the crime of arson at English common law). 
 66. 28 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.D. Pa. 1812) (concerning the destruction of a 
shipping vessel). 
 67. Id. 
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Whitaker,68 invoked the right to destroy to uphold the validity of 
a will.69  
By the twentieth century, the right to destroy seemed firmly 
entrenched as a “stick” in the “bundle of rights” that came to 
define property ownership.70 American courts continued to state 
that a person could not be convicted of arson merely for burning 
down her own property71 and invoked the right to destroy in 
other various contexts.72 Scholars, moreover, routinely listed the 
right to destroy as a fundamental incident of ownership.73 Indeed, 
Black’s Law Dictionary included among the rights of a property 
owner the right “to spoil or destroy it, as far as the law 
permits,”74 at least until 1999.75 As Professor Strahilevitz noted, 
this revision was “neither an accident nor an outlier.”76 The next 
subpart explores why that is so. 
                                                                                                     
 68. 32 La. Ann. 1055 (La. 1880). 
 69. See id. at 1062 (noting that a property owner “may destroy and 
annihilate that which belongs to him,” and thus questioning “why” a testator 
“should not have the right of determining its disposition after his death”). 
 70. See 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2008) (discussing property rights 
through the bundle of sticks metaphor); UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note 
10, at § 1.03(B) (same). 
 71. See, e.g., Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 1942) 
(recognizing “that common law offenses against private property such as 
burglary, larceny, arson, and malicious mischief [do] not apply to an owner 
dealing with his own property”); Jones v. State, 70 N.E. 952, 953 (Ohio 1904) 
(acknowledging that Ohio’s arson statute “did not make it an offense to burn 
one’s own building”). 
 72. See, e.g., Cass v. Home Tobacco Warehouse Co., 223 S.W.2d 569, 571 
(Ky. 1949) (denying punitive damages because defendants “thought they had the 
right to destroy the building” because they believed they owned the property 
and thus “their acts were not malicious or wanton”). 
 73. See, e.g., George H. Weinmann, A Survey of the Law Concerning Dead 
Bodies, in 73 BULLETIN OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 21 (1929) (listing 
the right to destroy among other “important incidents of ownership”); J.E. 
Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture Of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 741 
(1996) (including the right to destroy in the “bundle of rights”); Roscoe Pound, 
The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939) 
(recognizing the right to destroy as one of six property rights). 
 74. Owner, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1990).  
 75. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (observing that the seventh 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary removed any reference to the right to destroy). 
 76. Id. at 784. 
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C. Limitations of the Right 
The right to destroy occupied a strange place in Anglo-
American law because it was implicitly recognized but rarely 
acknowledged.77 Then, in the late twentieth century and up to the 
present, courts and commentators began to reexamine the right 
to destroy.78 To one degree or another, these new appraisals 
tended to advocate limitations on the right.79 
1. Caselaw Exceptions 
Although courts rarely adjudicate the question,80 there are 
some instances in which they have curtailed the right to 
destroy.81 Many courts have refused to enforce provisions in wills 
calling for the destruction of the testator’s real property.82 Of this 
line of cases, Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.83 is probably the 
most famous.84 Judge Rendlen, writing for the Missouri Court of 
                                                                                                     
 77. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293 (“Despite 
its fundamental nature, the right to destroy is rarely made explicit in municipal 
law.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 787 (“The right to destroy evidently 
received more attention in antiquity than it does today.”). 
 78. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784 (discussing late-twentieth century 
cases examining the right to destroy); id. at 794 (noting that “few scholars had 
devoted much attention to the right to destroy” prior to the publication of two 
works in 1999 and 2001). 
 79. See id. at 786 (“In the twentieth century, the right to destroy fell out of 
favor, and the most recent literature has argued that such a right, if it exists at 
all, should be substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds.”). Professor 
Strahilevitz’s 2005 article is thus somewhat of an outlier in this field of study. 
 80. See id. at 794 (noting that there are “relatively few published opinions 
that squarely implicate an owner’s right to destroy”); supra note 47 and 
accompanying text (discussing why there are a dearth of cases on the right to 
destroy). 
 81. See id. at 796 (discussing the “bases for restricting the right to 
destroy”). 
 82. See id. at 796 (observing that “the most prominent set of cases” limiting 
the right “involve efforts by landowners to destroy their homes via will”). 
 83. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
 84. See Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy 
Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. 
L. REV. 911, 927 (2001) (acknowledging that Eyerman is the case “most often 
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Appeals, made the court’s rationale quite explicit: “A well-ordered 
society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources 
when such acts directly affect important interests of other 
members of that society.”85 It is unclear from the opinion what 
facts would have resulted in a different outcome, but this 
sweeping language—though dicta—suggests that the court’s 
underlying reasoning might not have necessarily been limited to 
testamentary dispositions of real property.86  
Other courts have since followed Eyerman and enjoined 
executors from carrying out the destructive wishes of testators on 
the basis of waste.87 Waste, however, is not the singular concern 
of courts grappling with an owner’s right to destroy her property. 
For example, cases concerning the destruction of “artistic works” 
often implicate the right to destroy.88 The Visual Artists Rights 
Act of 1990 (VARA)89 permits courts to enjoin owners of works of 
art from destroying their property on the basis of artists’ rights.90 
In Martin v. City of Indianapolis,91 the destruction had already 
                                                                                                     
cited as an example of a wasteful desire of a testator”). 
 85. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217 (emphasis added). 
 86. Indeed, the majority opinion only goes so far to say that a person “is 
generally restrained from wasteful expenditure or destructive inclinations by 
the natural desire to enjoy his property or to accumulate it during his lifetime.” 
Id. at 215. 
 87. See, e.g., In re Estate of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492–93 (Sur. Ct. 1977) 
(refusing to uphold a will provision directing the razing of testator’s property 
and finding such a provision “immoral, a waste, [and] against public policy”); see 
also Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 33, 70–71 (1999) (explaining that “bequests for purposes that a court 
deems ‘capricious’” are frequently invalidated, with provisions “involving either 
the disuse or destruction of property” offered as an example). 
 88. SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 298. 
 89. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). 
 90. See id. (granting “the author of a work of visual art . . . the right . . . to 
prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation”); Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (enjoining 
defendants from “distorting, mutilating, or modifying plaintiffs’ art work”), aff’d 
in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 91. 192 F.3d 608 (1999). 
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occurred and so the artist-plaintiff was awarded “statutory 
damages.”92  
Other right to destroy cases tend to be more idiosyncratic 
(perhaps due to the rarity of such cases). One court, bucking 
tradition,93 refused to enforce a provision in a will directing that 
the testator be buried with some of her property.94 Oddly enough, 
the court’s justification was apparently to deter grave-robbing,95 
reasoning few other courts have found persuasive.96 Perhaps 
more understandably, courts will sometimes curtail an owner’s 
right to destroy her animals by will.97 The basis for this exception 
to the right to destroy appears to rest on animal cruelty grounds, 
however, as opposed to the doctrine of waste.98 
2. Scholarly Disapproval 
Much of the negative treatment towards the right to destroy 
comes from academia.99 These works, of course, have no legal 
                                                                                                     
 92. Id. at 610. 
 93. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784 (“American cadavers are 
frequently buried wearing wedding rings, other jewelry, and expensive 
clothing.”). 
 94. See In re Meksras’ Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 373 (C.P. 1974) 
(holding “that decedent’s direction to be buried with her jewelry is contrary to 
public policy, and such provision of the will is void”). Although not strictly the 
same, burying property is akin to a destructive act. See Strahilevitz, supra note 
9, at 800–03 (discussing “the destruction of chattel property via burial”). 
 95. See Meksras’ Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d at 373 (“If a practice is developed 
in our State to foster the burying of valuables with a deceased, our cemeteries 
like the tombs of the Pharaohs will be ravaged and violated.”). 
 96. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 800–01 (observing that “Meksras is 
apparently the only published American case on the question of the legality of 
burying valuable chattels along with a cadaver” and that other cases “dealing 
with grave robbing suggest that the Meksras rule is not adhered to 
universally”). 
 97. See Sykas, supra note 84, at 930–34 (discussing cases in which courts 
refuse to enforce will provisions providing for the destruction of the testator’s 
animals). 
 98. See id. at 934 (noting that in a Vermont case, “public sentiment 
concerning animal rights and the unique property status of pets influenced the 
court’s” refusal to enforce the testamentary destruction of the animals). 
 99. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785 (“The right to destroy presently 
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effect, but they are nevertheless influential on courts and 
lawmakers.100 Many of these arguments rest on the theories of 
John Locke, who viewed property rights as stemming from 
natural law and property as “gifts bestowed by God upon man” to 
be “held by man in stewardship.”101 Other scholars, however, 
have argued for limiting an owner’s right to destroy her property 
without invoking Locke at all.102 This section deals primarily with 
those arguments. 
One of the more prominent scholarly works attacking the 
right to destroy is Edward McCaffery’s Must We Have the Right to 
Waste?103 As one might infer from this title, Professor McCaffery 
argues that we should abolish the right to destroy because the 
right permits owners to waste valuable resources.104 Rather than 
echoing any Lockean concerns about stewardship,105 his criticism 
rests primarily on economic grounds.106 His solution is also 
                                                                                                     
lacks a constituency within the American legal academy.”). Of course, it is 
important to keep in mind that, as with courts, academics have by and large 
devoted little attention to the right. See id. at 794 (discussing the comparative 
lack of literature on the right to destroy). 
 100. See id. at 784 (noting that at least some scholarly works have given 
“further momentum” to the “trend of substantially curtailing property owners’ 
destruction rights”). 
 101. ROBERTA KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A MORAL RIGHTS 
LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 25 (2010); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE 
OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT AND END OF 
CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Richard H. Cox, ed., John Wiley & Sons 2014) (“Nothing 
was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.”). Indeed, “waste” was “a kind of 
‘robbery’ for Locke.” A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 321 
(1994). 
 102. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784–85 (discussing two critics of 
the right to destroy: Joseph Sax, who argues against the right on the basis of 
“cultural significance,” and Edward McCaffery, who “argue[s] that there is no 
place for a right to destroy or waste one's own property in a modern economy”). 
 103. McCaffery, supra note 14. 
 104. See id. at 76–77 (contending that there are “good reasons” for the 
“disdain” of waste and arguing “against the continuance of the jus abutendi [or 
right to destroy]”). 
 105. See LOCKE, supra note 101, at 29 (espousing that one who properly used 
property “wasted not the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of the 
Goods that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his 
hands” (emphasis added)). 
 106. See McCaffery, supra note 14, at 77 (arguing that “waste . . . has 
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economic in nature: a “consistent consumption tax” and shift 
towards a “life estate conception of ownership.”107 The 
complexities of McCaffery’s proposal are beyond the purview of 
this Note.108 However, one central premise of his argument is 
quite relevant: “The jus abutendi stands as an embarrassment in 
Anglo-American law.”109 
This attitude towards the right to destroy is not unique to 
Professor McCaffery.110 Yet few attack the right directly, 
preferring—whether intentionally or not—to merely ignore it. For 
instance, Robert E. Goodin’s book on the philosophy of “green” 
political parties is highly dismissive of the right to destroy.111 
Goodin not only denies the existence of the right, but any need for 
it as well.112 Similarly, many persuasive authorities simply fail to 
mention that a property owner has the right to destroy her 
property.113 Perhaps most egregiously, the right has been absent 
from the pages of Black’s Law Dictionary since the turn of this 
century.114 
                                                                                                     
become the more important threat to the collective welfare of a reasonable 
society”). 
 107. Id. at 98–103. 
 108. Of course, any reader would benefit from taking the time to peruse 
Professor McCaffery’s arguments. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 784 
(referring to Professor McCaffery as one “of the nation’s most capable property 
scholars”). 
 109. McCaffery, supra note 14, at 81. This Note takes the opposite position; 
rather than an embarrassment, the jus abutendi can serve a useful purpose in a 
world where the cloud storage model is the rapidly becoming the norm. See infra 
Parts VI–V (developing this argument further). 
 110. See, e.g., PETER M. GERHART, PROPERTY LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY 237–
38 (2013) (discussing instances where “law is . . . justified in intervening to 
prevent destruction”). 
 111. See ROBERT E. GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 106 (2013) (claiming 
that the right to destroy “is mentioned nowhere [on standard lists of property 
rights] . . . and it appears only incidentally and very much in passing on [other 
lists]”). 
 112. See id. at 106–08 (arguing that the right to destroy cannot be justified). 
 113. See, e.g., 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 27 (2015) (“The primary incidents 
of ownership include the right to possession, the use and enjoyment of the 
property, the right to change or improve the property, and the right to alienate 
the property at will.”). 
 114. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that “as part of an 
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D. The Right Today 
The sum of this history is that the right to destroy is 
recognized, but limited; tolerated, but disfavored.115 Professor 
Sprankling’s text on international property law keenly observes 
the difficulty in discussing it: “Despite its fundamental nature, 
the right to destroy is rarely made explicit in municipal law. Yet 
the right is implicitly recognized in virtually all legal systems.”116 
American law today reflects this global attitude towards the right 
to destroy, neither expressly authorizing nor prohibiting property 
owners (such as Blendtec)117 from destroying their property in 
most circumstances.118  
Whether the limitations discussed in the preceding subpart 
are sound is not the inquiry at the heart of this Note. More 
troubling is the fact that some courts fail to include the right to 
destroy (limited or otherwise) among other property rights, 
thereby threatening to erode even its implicit recognition.119 It is 
worth remembering that the right to destroy was once considered 
a fundamental property right, for reasons that have not since lost 
their relevance.120 Although, as this Note will argue, the growing 
                                                                                                     
extensive revision, the seventh edition’s editors decided to exclude . . . the right 
to destroy”).  
 115. Professor Sprankling’s 2012 property casebook is illustrative here, 
listing the right to destroy alongside the more familiar rights to use, exclude, 
and transfer, but with the caveat that its “scope . . . remains unclear.” 
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note 10, at § 1.03(B)(5). 
 116. SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 293. 
 117. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text (discussing the blender 
company’s exercise of the right to destroy via promotional videos distributed on 
YouTube). 
 118. See SPRANKLING, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 39, at 296 (“The 
logical implication is that a person holding absolute ownership . . . would have 
the right to destroy.”); see also supra Part II.B–C (discussing cases recognizing, 
and limiting, the right to destroy). 
 119. Compare Evanston Ins. Co. v. Legacy of Life, Inc., 370 S.W.3d 377, 385 
(Tex. 2012) (“Some of the key rights that make up the bundle of property rights 
include the rights to possess, use, transfer, and exclude others.”), with Council 
on American-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, 793 F. Supp. 2d 
311, 339 (D.D.C. 2011) (“One of the many sticks in the owner’s bundle of 
property rights is the right to destroy the property.”). 
 120. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing justifications for the right to destroy 
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trend of maintaining digital property on the cloud provides a new 
justification for reaffirming the right to destroy,121 the underlying 
spirit of that justification is rooted in, and informed by, this 
history. 
III. Understanding the Cloud 
“Nobody understands the Cloud!” bawls a beleaguered Jay 
Hargrove (portrayed by Jason Segal) in the 2014 movie Sex 
Tape.122 Although a comedic exaggeration, the words probably 
capture the sentiment of many when it comes to cloud 
computing.123 Therefore, before going further, it would be prudent 
to explain what, exactly, the cloud is. That explanation proceeds 
in two steps. The first subpart will examine the nature of digital 
property itself.124 The second subpart will define the cloud and 
chronicle the almost meteoric rise of cloud computing.125 Finally, 
with this foundation in mind, the last subpart will provide a brief 
overview of the cloud computing service pertinent to this Note, 
cloud storage.126 
A. The Digital Property Question 
The central subject of this Note is digital property stored in 
the cloud—but what is digital property? Before that question can 
                                                                                                     
in Roman law and English common law). 
 121. See infra Part V (arguing the need for the right to destroy in the 
present era of cloud computing). 
 122. Sex Tape (Columbia Pictures 2014). Sex Tape follows the arduous 
journey of a married couple attempting to delete a private video inadvertently 
uploaded to the cloud. Id. Though by no means a masterpiece, the film usefully 
illustrates the need for a right to destroy in the cloud computing context.  
 123. See WAKEFIELD, CITRIX CLOUD SURVEY GUIDE 1 (Aug. 2012) (reporting 
the public’s misconceptions regarding the cloud); see also HOOFNAGLE, supra 
note 25, at 9 (discussing the public’s wariness of cloud computing). 
 124. See infra Part III.A (addressing whether the law recognizes digital 
property and how “digital property” ought to be defined). 
 125. See infra Part III.B (discussing cloud computing generally). 
 126. See infra Part III.C (defining cloud storage and providing examples of 
cloud storage services). 
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be resolved, a threshold issue demands exploration: does digital 
property, in the legal sense, even exist? The answer, 
frustratingly, is both yes and no.127 
In Kremen v. Cohen,128 Judge Alex Kozinski of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained that “[p]roperty is a 
broad concept that includes ‘every intangible benefit and 
prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.’”129 Electronic 
files—think images, documents, songs, and other data—would 
appear to meet this definition; although often subject to license 
agreements,130 we buy, sell, trade, and use electronic files with 
ever increasing frequency.131 Indeed, digital estate planners have 
recently begun to crop up nationwide.132 Yet the law often ignores 
                                                                                                     
 127. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805, 810 
(2015) [hereinafter Fairfield, Bitproperty] (“[O]nline property interests are 
either intellectual property interests or strange amalgams of contract, licensing, 
and pseudoproperty law, such as those that govern users’ interests in e-books, 
MP3s, software, or downloaded movies.”); Juliet M. Moringiello, False 
Categories in Commercial Law: The (Ir)relevance of (In)tangibility, 35 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 119, 142–43 (2007) (discussing views “express[ing] skepticism that 
digital code within a computer can or should be analogized to a form of 
property”). 
 128. 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 129. Id. at 1030 (quoting Downing v. Mun. Ct. of S.F., 198 P.2d 923, 926 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). 
 130. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839 (“Property rights in 
digital copies of copyrighted material drift in a limbo of [Digital Rights 
Management] and end user license agreements.”); infra Part V.C (discussing the 
use of license agreements in the digital property marketplace). 
 131. See, e.g., Tim Hurd, Law Journals and Emerging Publishing 
Technology, 30 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 231, 232 (2013) (observing that some 
journals make their issues available for purchase “in an eBook format”); Ashley 
F. Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death: What Will Your Heirs Have 
Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFFALO L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2014) (recognizing the 
“wide array of digital assets” owned by individuals today and noting that “the 
average American believed his or her digital assets to be worth about $55,000”); 
Duncan Clark, Playing by the Rules, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9, 2005, 7:07 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/music/2005/sep/09/netmusic.internet (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting that “a small but growing number of labels and artists 
have started selling MP3s directly from their own websites”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 132. See, e.g., Digital Assets, EVERPLANS, https://www.everplans.com/digital-
assets (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (providing instructions on how to plan one’s 
“digital” estate, which includes “social media profiles, downloaded music, photos, 
DISPERSING THE CLOUD 487 
key differences in the types of computer programming code that 
make up all things digital, regarding the entire category as a 
subset of intellectual property.133 Thus one could persuasively 
argue that the common name for goods made up of “electronic 
symbols created via a computer,”134 digital property, is something 
of a misnomer. 
Property law’s reluctance to recognize digital property is not 
necessarily without justification. Some kinds of digital property 
are not analogous to tangible goods; a block of code that gives a 
website a particular function, for instance, instinctively seems 
like something that intellectual property law should properly 
govern.135 On the other hand, a PDF version of a novel serves the 
same function as a paper copy of the novel bound and printed by 
a publisher.136 True, there are some differences: a person can 
make copies of a PDF far more easily than she can make copies of 
a printed book.137 But these differences arguably lie in degree, not 
                                                                                                     
[and] videos”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 133. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1047, 1049–
50 (2005) [hereinafter Fairfield, Virtual Property] (noting that some “code” is 
“protected by the law of intellectual property” and that “we continue to govern 
virtual property through the law of intellectual property”); Moringiello, supra 
note 127, at 147 (observing the “tendency to place new intangible rights into the 
category of intellectual property in case law and scholarship”). But see Kremen 
v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing the lower court’s 
holding “that domain names, although a form of property, are intangibles not 
subject to conversion”). 
 134. Michael S. Richardson, Comment, The Monopoly on Digital 
Distribution, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 153, 158 (2014). 
Richardson observes with disapproval that digital property is “not considered 
property” because “property is limited to a “material object or movement of 
power.” Id. 
 135. See Telebright Corp., Inc. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Taxation, 424 N.J. Super. 
384, 388–89 (2012) (characterizing an employee’s “computer code” that is 
“added” to her employer’s “software” as intellectual property). 
 136. See Caitlin J. Akins, Student Article, Conversion of Digital Property: 
Protecting Consumers in the Age of Technology, 23 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 215, 
244–47 (2010) (discussing the similarities between e-books and physical books 
and arguing that “intangible digital property, like e-books,” should be treated 
“as chattels”). 
 137. See, e.g., Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the 
movement of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly 
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substance.138 As scholars have noted, the tangibility–intangibility 
distinction makes little sense in the modern, digitized world.139 
Indeed, many have argued that the technology is now in 
place to treat intangible digital property exactly as tangible 
property.140 Some American courts have adopted this view in 
part, applying ordinary property law to certain digital assets.141 
Legislatures, too, are beginning to realize the need for broader 
digital property rights; several states have enacted “laws 
regarding digital assets” in recent years.142 Courts of other 
nations have gone even further; according to the European Court 
of Justice, there is “no difference whether the copy of the 
computer program was made available by means of a download or 
                                                                                                     
instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and negligible 
cost.”). 
 138. Furthermore, technologies exist that “limit unauthorized uses of 
copyrighted materials by adding sophisticated security programs to digital 
products, making it difficult for users to create copies.” Akins, supra note 136, at 
221; see also Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 867 (discussing “emerging 
technology that attempted to create discrete, rival rights in intangible assets”). 
 139. See Moringiello, supra note 127, at 120 (arguing that “[c]lassifying 
property according to its tangibility or intangibility creates false categories 
unrelated to significant legal distinction”). 
 140. See, e.g., Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 874 (advocating the 
use of “block chain technology” to “create an operational system of digital 
property”); Akins, supra note 136, at 250–51 (arguing that the tort of conversion 
should to apply to digital property); Richardson, supra note 134, at 171 (arguing 
that “the first sale doctrine” should be applied to “digital property transactions 
that resemble real world sales”). 
 141. See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1278 
(N.Y. 2007) (“We cannot conceive of any reason in law or logic why [drafting a 
document in electronic form] should be treated any differently from production 
by pen on paper . . . . A document stored on a computer hard drive has the same 
value as a paper document kept in a file cabinet.”); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 
1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the tort of conversion applicable to domain 
names). 
 142. Watkins, supra note 131, at 220. For instance, Delaware law provides 
that a “fiduciary may exercise control over any and all rights in digital assets 
and digital accounts of an account holder.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2015). 
How courts will interpret these statutes, however, remains to be seen. See 
Watkins, supra note 131, at 221 n.179 (“No one has attempted to use these 
statutes in court yet, so it is hard to say for sure the statutes’ value.”). 
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on a DVD/CD-ROM.”143 A Dutch court later followed this same 
reasoning to permit the sale of “secondhand” e-books.144 
Now, to return to the question that began this subpart: what 
is digital property? For the purposes of this Note, it is digital 
assets.145 These assets include “images, photos, videos, and text 
files.”146 Although such assets were once predominantly stored 
locally, on hard drives and USB sticks, for instance, today they 
are often stored elsewhere, in a frequently misunderstood place 
known as the cloud.147 
                                                                                                     
 143. Richardson, supra note 134, at 168. 
 144. See David Meyer, Secondhand E-bookstore Tom Kabinet Can Stay 
Online, Dutch Court Rules, GIGAOM (July 22, 2014, 1:19 AM), 
http://gigaom.com/2014/07/22/secondhand-ebook-store-tom-kabinet-can-stay-
online-dutch-court-rules (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“A Dutch secondhand e-
bookstore has successfully defended a court case brought about by the country’s 
publishers’ association, which argues that e-books cannot be legally resold.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 145. Although the legal status of digital property can only be called 
unresolved, digital assets have become ubiquitous in our society. See JOHN 
PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION 
OF DIGITAL NATIVES 2 (2009) (noting that many “aspects” of young peoples’ 
“lives . . . are mediated by digital technologies”). 
 146. John Romano, A Working Definition of Digital Assets, THE DIGITAL 
BEYOND (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2011/09/a-working-
definition-of-digital-assets/comment-page-1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For a more encompassing definition 
that would necessarily include the kinds of digital assets pertinent to this Note, 
see FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript at 14 
Digital property refers to your ownership rights . . . in digital objects, 
like the game, movie, book, or music that you have purchased and 
downloaded. Digital property can be as new and strange as a Bitcoin 
or a magical sword in a massively multiplayer online video game, or 
as old as the bits and bytes of data that represent the numbers in 
your bank account or stock portfolio. 
 147. See Lixian Loong Hantover, The Cloud and the Deep Sea: How Cloud 
Storage Raises the Stakes for Undersea Cable Security and Liability, 19 OCEAN 
& COASTAL L.J. 1, 1 (2013) (noting that we have “give[n] up our hard drives for 
storage online in the cloud”). 
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B. The Rise of Cloud Computing 
What is the cloud? Even among industry experts, the answer 
to that question is up in the air.148 The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) provides a very specific 
definition, replete with industry jargon:  
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, 
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, 
storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or 
service provider interaction. This cloud model is composed of 
five essential characteristics [on-demand self-service, broad 
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and 
measured service], three service models [software-as-a-service, 
platform-as-a-service, and infrastructure-as-a-service], and 
four deployment models [private cloud, community cloud, 
public cloud, and hybrid cloud].149 
Others, by contrast, view the cloud very generally as “a 
metaphor for the Internet.”150 There are myriad definitions 
between these two extremes,151 but one strikes a good balance: 
cloud computing is the “on-demand delivery” of “resources and 
applications over the Internet.”152 This definition, though less 
technical than the NIST’s, is perhaps more palatable to the IT 
novice and will suffice for the purposes of this Note. 
These competing definitions are relevant because how we 
conceptualize the cloud determines, among other things, when 
exactly cloud computing got its start.153 It would be easy to 
assume that the cloud is new technology, given that the term was 
                                                                                                     
 148. See Sharon K. Sandeen, Lost in the Cloud: Information Flows and the 
Implications of Cloud Computing for Trade Secret Protection, 19 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 5–6 (2014) (discussing various proposed definitions of cloud computing). 
 149. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 19, at 2. 
 150. Sandeen, supra note 148, at 6. 
 151. See id. (“Many people and organizations have defined cloud computing 
slightly differently.”). 
 152. RAY RAFAELS, CLOUD COMPUTING: FROM BEGINNING TO END 12 (2015). 
 153. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 18 (observing that “cloud computing is 
either a revolutionary development or the hyped-up, repackaging of pre-existing 
business models”).  
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first coined in the late 1990s154 and entered the common parlance 
only recently.155 The foundations of cloud computing, however, 
were laid out long ago.156 These early, mostly theoretical notions 
of the cloud resemble what some today have equated cloud 
computing with: the internet.157 On the other hand, the meaning 
of cloud computing “has evolved over time, and it is still 
evolving.”158  
It is thus unclear when, precisely, cloud computing began to 
really take hold; such dating might not even be possible.159 What 
is clear, however, is that the cloud has taken hold, with no less 
firm a grasp than other ubiquitous technologies, such as personal 
computers themselves.160 The vast majority of businesses use 
cloud computing in one way or another,161 and the same is true 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The Ethical Implications of 
Cloud Computing for Lawyers, 31 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 69, 72 
(2014) (noting that “Ramnath K. Chellappa of Emory University” coined “the 
term ‘cloud computing’ in 1997”). 
 155. See Google Trends, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=% 
22cloud%20computing%22 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting no Google 
searches for the term “cloud computing” until 2007) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 156. Pardau & Edwards, supra note 154, at 72 (observing that “the 
underlying concept” of cloud computing “dates back to the Fifties”). 
 157. See id. (noting that in 1969 a computer scientist “introduced an idea for 
‘an intergalactic computer network’ in which programs and data could be 
accessed from anywhere”). This makes sense, as cloud computing was perhaps a 
“natural progression for the computer, Internet, and telecommunications 
industries.” Sandeen, supra note 148, at 24–25. 
 158. David Linthicum, Pop Quiz: Who Invented Cloud Computing?, 
INFOWORLD (May 30, 2014), http://www.infoworld.com/article/2608420/cloud-
computing/pop-quiz--who-invented-cloud-computing-.html (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 159. See id. (“The concept of ‘the cloud’ is and was far different from its 
meaning in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s . . . .”). 
 160. See, e.g., F5, THE NEW LANGUAGE OF CLOUD COMPUTING 1 (2015), 
https://f5.com/Portals/1/Images/infographics/Inforgraphic-The-New-Language-
Of-Cloud-Computing/Info%20Paper_New%20Language%20of%20Cloud%20APA
C%20(12July2015)%20FINAL.pdf (“Today cloud is no longer the buzzword of 
five years ago, and is now part of the fabric of the modern enterprise.”). 
 161. See RIGHTSCALE, 2015 STATE OF THE CLOUD REPORT 5–6 (2015), 
http://assets.rightscale.com/uploads/pdfs/RightScale-2015-State-of-the-Cloud-
Report.pdf (finding that, of 930 professionals surveyed, only ten percent do not 
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for individuals, even if they are unaware of the precise meaning 
of the cloud.162 Moreover, consumer usage of the cloud is 
predicted to grow even higher in the years to come.163 Although 
cloud computing takes many forms,164 one cloud-based service in 
particular might account for this surge in popularity: the subject 
of this Note and the following subpart, cloud storage.165 
C. An Overview of Cloud Storage 
Cloud storage, also known as “storage-as-a-service,”166 is 
most likely what comes to mind when consumers think of the 
cloud.167 It is, in short, a “model of data storage where digital 
                                                                                                     
and do not plan to use cloud computing services). 
 162. See Tony Danova, Most People Are Still Confused About Cloud Storage, 
and No One Service Is Winning the Race to Educate and Acquire Users, BUS. 
INSIDER (Aug. 22, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/people-use-
the-cloud-and-dont-even-realize-it-2014-7 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting 
that “90% of global internet users are already on the cloud, and that number 
will remain steady as internet usage spreads globally,” but acknowledging that, 
“despite so much usage, consumer awareness of cloud services remains low”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 163. See Jagdish Rebello, Consumers Aggressively Migrate Data to Cloud 
Storage in First Half of 2012, IHS TECH. (Oct. 15, 2012), 
http://technology.ihs.com/413377/consumers-aggressively-migrate-data-to-cloud 
storage-in-first-half-of-2012 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (predicting “1.3 billion” 
subscriptions to cloud services by 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 164. See Christina Chow, Note, Capitol Records, Inc.: Holding No Public 
Performance Violations for Deleting Duplicative Files Off Cloud Servers and the 
Positive Future Implications Regarding Consumer Efficiency, 20 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. 121, 124 (2012) (“Currently, there are a number of different types of cloud 
computing.”). 
 165. See id. 
One of the more recently developed cloud servers is one that acts in 
the same manner as a personal computer's internal memory. Cloud 
servers of this type, such as Dropbox, allow users to sign up for an 
account and receive a certain amount of storage space where they can 
save, store, and access files as they would on their computer's hard 
drive or on an external memory stick. 
 166. RALPH STAIR & GEORGE REYNOLDS, PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
121 (2015). 
 167. See David Colarusso, Note, Heads in the Cloud, a Coming Storm: The 
Interplay of Cloud Computing, Encryption, and the Fifth Amendment’s 
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data are remotely accessed, stored, maintained, and backed 
up.”168 Cloud storage can itself be divided into several 
subcategories, but predominantly refers to the “public cloud.”169 
Other forms include private or personal cloud storage, where 
users essentially maintain their own cloud (or pay a third party 
to maintain a cloud exclusively for their use),170 and hybrid cloud 
storage, a “composition” of both public and private cloud 
storage.171 The security of a private cloud alleviates some of this 
Note’s concerns,172 but requires a heavier investment of resources 
and more “hands on management” compared to public cloud 
services.173 As such, private cloud storage is not a practical option 
for individuals and out of reach for many businesses.174 
The public cloud storage model essentially consists of users 
(not necessarily paying subscribers) storing their digital files on 
servers owned and operated by a third party.175 Access is 
                                                                                                     
Protection Against Self-Incrimination, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 69, 81 (2011) 
(observing the “general recognition that cloud computing is the practice of 
storing and processing data”). 
 168. RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 32. 
 169. See LUCIO GRANDINETTI ET AL., PERVASIVE CLOUD COMPUTING 
TECHNOLOGIES: FUTURE OUTLOOKS AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 62 
(2013) (describing the public cloud as “the main cloud computing model”). 
 170. See id. at 61 (noting that a “private cloud . . . is operated solely for an 
organization,” but that it “may exist on premise or off premise”). 
 171. Id. at 62. 
 172. See id. at 61–62 (2013) (explaining that the “private cloud” lacks some 
“risks and threats such as security, governance, and reliability concerns,” and 
observing that “a customer of a private cloud has a high degree of control and 
oversight of the physical and logical security aspects of private cloud 
infrastructure”). 
 173. Id. at 61. 
 174. See S. SRINIVASAN, CLOUD COMPUTING BASICS 17 (“Private clouds are 
predominantly used by large businesses that need to supplement their data 
centers in a reliable way.”). Therefore, this Note focuses exclusively on the 
“public cloud” and use that term interchangeably with cloud storage in general. 
 175. See Aaron J. Gold, Note, Obscured by Clouds: The Fourth Amendment 
and Searching Cloud Storage Accounts Through Locally Installed Software, 56 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2321, 2323 (2015) (“Companies providing public cloud 
storage maintain user data on clusters of networked servers at off-site 
locations.”). 
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typically granted through a website or mobile application.176 This 
data, now on the cloud, can then be accessed by anyone with the 
user’s credentials.177 Moreover, the files are typically “synced,” 
which means they exist simultaneously on the cloud and the 
user’s local device, such as a computer’s hard drive or the internal 
memory of a smartphone, via frequent updating.178 
Although the cloud is spoken of in the singular, there is a 
veritable multitude of public cloud storage services.179 Many are 
geared towards individuals and small businesses, offering free 
storage up to a certain allotment, then charging a fee on a sliding 
scale.180 Some of these services may even be automatic; that is, 
the user herself may not necessarily be aware that her files are 
being stored on the cloud.181 Other cloud storage providers more 
                                                                                                     
 176. See id. at 2323–24 (observing that cloud storage users can “access their 
data from any Internet-capable device”). 
 177. See id. at 2334 n.73 (“For example, members of the William & Mary 
Law Review share a cloud storage account provided by Dropbox.”). 
 178. See Jeffrey Allen, ROAD WARRIOR: Data Migration and 
Synchronization, 30 GPSOLO 4, 4 (2013) (noting that “[cloud] data can be 
synchronized easily across devices”). 
 179. See Stacy Fisher, Best Cloud Storage Services for Backup, BALANCE, 
http://freebies.about.com/od/computerfreebies/tp/free-cloud-storage.htm (last 
updated Jan. 3, 2017) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (weighing the pros and cons of 
several cloud storage options) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 180. See, e.g., Buy, Change, or Cancel Storage Plans, GOOGLE, 
http://support.google.com/drive/answer/2375123?hl=en (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) (offering plans of fifteen gigabytes of cloud storage for free, 100 gigabytes 
for $1.99 a month, and thirty terabytes—or 30,000 gigabytes—for $299.99 a 
month, among others) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014) (observing that 
“[c]ell phone users often may not know whether particular information is stored 
on the device or in the cloud”); FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript 
at 173 (noting that certain devices “enable cloud storage not only for data that 
the user wishes to store elsewhere, but also for every temporary or unsaved file 
on several widely used applications and even for local files residing on a user’s 
encrypted hard drive”); David Gilbert, Apple ‘Actively Investigating’ if iCloud Is 
to Blame for Jennifer Lawrence Nude Photo Leak, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/apple-actively-investigating-if-icloud-blame-
jennifer-lawrence-nude-photo-leak-1463551 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Apple’s 
iCloud automatically stores iPhone users photos and video in the cloud as a 
back-up measure, with many people unaware that this is happening.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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directly target commercial enterprises.182 These services tend to 
be costlier, but emphasize features such as privacy and 
security.183 
It is easy to appreciate why consumers have so rapidly 
adopted the cloud for their digital storage needs.184 For 
businesses, the benefits of cloud storage are both practical and 
economical.185 For individuals, cloud storage offers unprecedented 
convenience.186 This latter point is especially important given 
that modern personal technology tends to be spread around 
multiple devices (the combination of a laptop, work computer, 
tablet, and smartphone, for instance) rather than a single 
machine tethered to one particular location.187 It is thus no 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Shobhit Seth, 8 Best Cloud Storage Solutions for Small Business, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-
finance/090715/8-best-cloud-storage-solutions-small-business.asp (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing several business-oriented cloud storage providers) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 183. See, e.g., id. (discussing the cloud storage service “SpiderOak,” which 
touts among its features “privacy” and “full control to the clients”). 
 184. See Erin Griffith, Who’s Winning the Consumer Cloud Storage Wars?, 
FORTUNE (Nov. 6, 2014, 11:44 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/11/06/dropbox-
google-drive-microsoft-onedrive (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Dropbox claims 300 
million users as of May. Google Drive has 240 million users as of September. 
Microsoft says OneDrive has ‘more than’ 250 million users.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 185. See IS TECHNOLOGY, CLOUD STORAGE TRENDS FOR 2015 2 (2015), 
http://www.iisl.com/userfiles/files/10294_cloud_trends_2015_WP.pdf (reporting 
that “80% of companies that adopt cloud technologies see improvements within 
six months of adoption”). 
 186. See Mark Wilson, Comment, Castle in the Cloud: Modernizing 
Constitutional Protections for Cloud-Stored Data on Mobile Devices, 43 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 261, 268 (2013) (“Users choose to store their information in the 
Cloud, and not on their computers, for a variety of reasons. Information may be 
stored in the Cloud as a backup . . . [and] users of all types find it convenient to 
access cloud-stored information wherever they have an Internet connection.”). 
 187. See STUART TAYLOR ET AL., A “MARRIAGE MADE IN HEAVEN”: MOBILE 
DEVICES MEET THE MOBILE CLOUD 2 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/abo
ut/ac79/docs/sp/Mobile_Cloud_Device.pdf (“The collision of [the trends of mobile 
devices and cloud computing]—the mobile cloud—stands to . . . radically alter 
the way people live, learn, work, and play.”); Wilson, supra note 186, at 268 
(observing the correlation between the use of smartphones and cloud storage 
services). 
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exaggeration to say that cloud storage, for most, is less a matter 
of utility than necessity.188  
IV. Property Rights Lost in the Cloud 
We now (hopefully) understand what the cloud is and why it 
has become so prevalent.189 But cloud computing is not without 
its drawbacks. As alluded to in this Note’s introduction, the rapid 
adoption of cloud storage services threatens the property rights of 
the owners of cloud-maintained data in two closely related 
senses.190 First, it prevents such owners from fully controlling 
their property.191 Second, it robs such owners of the certainty that 
their property rights—whether the right to use, transfer, exclude, 
destroy, or some other—are being effectively exercised.192 We 
might alternatively label this as a “peace of mind” problem. The 
following subparts will discuss these problems more 
comprehensively in turn. 
A. The Control Problem 
Anglo-American law conceptualizes property as a “bundle of 
rights,”193 but what are these rights meant to actually confer 
upon their holders? The answer, essentially, is control.194 This 
                                                                                                     
 188. See STUART TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 187, at 6, 11 (noting that 
“smartphone usage and the adoption of mobile cloud services are intimately 
linked, forming a virtuous circle”). 
 189. See supra Part III.B–C (discussing the cloud and cloud storage). 
 190. See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text (arguing that the 
convenience of the cloud comes at the cost of property owners’ control and peace 
of mind). 
 191. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the “control problem” of cloud storage). 
 192. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the “certainty problem” of cloud 
storage). 
 193. 63C AM. JUR. 2D Property § 1 (2008); SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING 
PROPERTY, supra note 10, at § 1.03(B). 
 194. See, e.g., Laura B. Bartell, The Lease of Money in Bankruptcy: Time for 
Consistency?, 16 BANK. DEV. J. 267, 318 (2000) (“Although one can have control 
over property without ownership . . . ownership of property generally carries 
with it the unrestricted right to control.”); FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, 
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becomes clear when we consider the rights—the “sticks” in the 
“bundle”—themselves.195 The right to possess and use is most 
obvious; to “use” a thing, in the most basic sense, is to “control” 
it.196 Moreover, when dealing with intangible property such as 
data (whether stored on the cloud or not), control is the only 
means of possession.197  
Other property rights also endow their holders with control. 
The right to exclude, and the corollary right to include,198 allow 
the right-holder to control who can make use of the property and 
to what extent.199 The right to destroy confers the owner with the 
                                                                                                     
manuscript at 13 (“We buy [property] so we can control it—protect it from 
others, use it ourselves, and, if we permit them to, determine how others use 
it.”); Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: A Solution for 
Common Law Property Systems?, 48 S.D. L. REV. 455, 465 (2003) (observing that 
“management and control over property includes many if not most of the 
benefits of ownership”). 
 195. Recall the most prominent rights in the bundle: “(1) the right to 
exclude; (2) the right to transfer; (3) the right to possess and use; and (4) the 
right to destroy.” SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 
§ 1.03(B). Depending on who you ask, however, the right to destroy may or may 
not be included in this list. See supra Part II.D (observing that the right to 
destroy is not consistently recognized). 
 196. Compare Control, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/control (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining “control” as 
“to direct the actions or function of (something)”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review), with Use, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/use (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (defining “use” as “the act 
or practice of employing something”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 197. See LINDA J. RUSCH & STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 
ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 258 (3d ed. 2014) (“Control is a conceptual analog to 
possession for certain types of intangible collateral, property for which physical 
possession is impossible.”). 
 198. See Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 861 
(2014) (arguing that the right to exclude implies the right to include and 
discussing “a number of institutional arrangements by which owners may 
include others”). 
 199. See FAIRFIELD, OWNED, supra note 22, manuscript at 13 (“The ability 
to control what goes on in and on and through our property is a function of our 
ability to exclude others.”); see also Kelly, supra note 198, at 869 (utilizing “the 
analogy of the gatekeeper to suggest that owners can include as well as 
exclude”). A gatekeeper, of course, is “a person who controls access.” Gatekeeper, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gatekeeper 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (emphasis added) (on file with the Washington and 
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ultimate control over the property: the property’s very existence. 
This is perhaps why the right is regarded as the most “extreme” 
stick in the bundle.200 Finally, the right to transfer grants the 
right-holder the power to control who shall possess any one or all 
of the other rights.201 
Conversely, a significant consequence of storing digital 
property on the cloud is a lack of control, which manifests most 
clearly when the user attempts to delete such property.202 To be 
sure, cloud storage is a predominantly user-managed system.203 
The subscriber to the cloud storage service decides which of her 
digital assets are to be stored on the cloud and who can access 
those assets—ostensibly, at least.204 In reality, the user is merely 
sending commands to the cloud storage provider via an 
application.205 The effects of those commands occur “under the 
hood,” through code designed and managed by the cloud storage 
service.206 
                                                                                                     
Lee Law Review). 
 200. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788, 794–95 (discussing the view that 
“the owner’s right to destroy his property [is] the most extreme use of property 
imaginable”). 
 201. See Kelly, supra note 198, at 869 (noting that the right to transfer is 
“an owner’s powers to transfer particular sticks in [the] bundle” of rights 
(citations omitted)). We might thus consider the right to transfer a kind of meta-
right within this framework. 
 202. See, e.g., Timothy D. Martin, Hey! You! Get Off of My Cloud: Defining 
and Protecting the Metes and Bounds of Privacy, Security, and Property in Cloud 
Computing, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 283, 289 (2010) (observing that 
cloud users “give up control over [their] data because much of it is stored in 
some unknown location in the cloud”); Robert Sheldon, Deleting Files in the 
Cloud, SIMPLE TALK (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.simple-talk.com/cloud/cloud-
data/deleting-files-in-the-cloud (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (explaining that cloud 
storage users “can’t control what service providers do with their data, especially 
the deleted stuff”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 203. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2324–29 (discussing the user’s role in 
storing digital files through cloud storage). 
 204. See id. at 2323, 2334 (noting that cloud storage users “can upload data 
to cloud servers in various ways” and that anyone with the user’s credentials 
can access cloud-maintained data). 
 205. See id. at 2347 (observing that a cloud provider may not necessarily 
adhere to a cloud user’s request). 
 206. See RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 32–38 (discussing the mechanics of 
cloud storage). In other words, “just because [files stored on the cloud] disappear 
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Furthermore, the owner of the cloud-maintained data lacks 
the power to prevent the cloud storage provider from deleting 
that data.207 Of course, the cloud storage provider is not likely to 
do this willfully.208 But the cloud is maintained by humans, and 
humans are prone to error.209 This, combined with the cloud 
storage providers’ lack of accountability,210 reinforces the central 
proposition of this Note: it is the owner of the cloud, and not the 
owner of the cloud-maintained digital property, who has all the 
control, power, and, indeed, the very incidents of ownership that 
property law is meant to secure.211 
These are not mere hypothetical concerns. Some time ago, 
the cloud storage provider Dropbox mishandled access 
permissions to files stored on its servers, allowing anyone, 
theoretically, to download the private files of another.212 In 
                                                                                                     
from view doesn’t mean they’re gone forever.” Sheldon, supra note 202. 
 207. See, e.g., Ovi Demetrian Jr., Google Drive Storage Loses Google Docs 
Data, GOOGLE DRIVE SUCKS, http://googledrivesucks.com (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) (discussing one user’s experience of losing “years of work and personal 
memories that [he] saved as Google Docs files because of a poor user interface”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 208. Still, it is fairly easy to imagine some scenarios in which a cloud storage 
provider may purposefully delete its users’ data. For instance, suppose a user 
stores a pirated music or movie file on her Dropbox account. Dropbox then may 
not only desire to delete the user’s data, but may be required to do so by a court 
of law. See, e.g., Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 
1996) (discussing a court order permitting the plaintiff to enter defendant’s 
premises and delete pirated software). Our sympathies may not lie with the 
digital pirate in that particular case, but the fact that a third party has that 
kind of power over a person’s property (albeit stolen property) is troubling at the 
very least. 
 209. See Timothy J. Calloway, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, 
and Limitation on Liability Clauses: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
163, 170 (2012) (“Cloud providers go to great lengths to provide reliable services 
to their customers. . . . Yet despite these precautions, server crashes, hard drive 
failures, and other disasters do occur, and customers suffer the consequences.”). 
 210. See id. at 168–69 (noting that many cloud storage agreements contain 
clauses limiting liability). 
 211. See Pound, supra note 73, at 997 (observing that “property involves six 
rights,” including “possessing” and “using”); supra notes 24–33 and 
accompanying text (discussing the distinctions between owning digital property 
maintained on the cloud, digital property generally, and tangible property). 
 212. See Nate Lord, Communicating the Data Security Risks of File Sharing 
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another instance, a “security flaw” resulted in numerous files 
stored on Dropbox being exposed to the internet at large.213 These 
may have only been “temporary situation[s],” but, as one industry 
expert put it, they “demonstrate[] the loss of user control when 
using [cloud storage] services.”214  
Perhaps more famously, in 2014 a computer hacker stole a 
number of celebrities’ digital photos stored on iCloud,215 one of 
the more popular cloud storage services.216 What surprised one of 
these victims, however, was that the stolen photos were supposed 
to have been deleted.217 Perhaps someone should have warned 
her: when it comes to cloud storage, there is no guarantee that 
the user’s commands will be heeded.218 Some cloud storage 
providers, in fact, are entirely upfront about this (to the extent a 
                                                                                                     
& Cloud Storage, DIGITAL GUARDIAN (Sept. 28, 2015), http://digital 
guardian.com/blog/communicating-data-security-risks-file-sharing-cloud-storage 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing “a brief period of time during which 
anyone could access any file stored by Dropbox just by knowing the correct 
URL”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 213. Sharif Sakr, Dropbox Cuts Access to Shared Documents that Were 
Accidentally Exposed to the Web, ENGADGET (May 6, 2014), 
http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/06/dropbox-forced-to-cut-links-to-shared-
documents (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Alan Duke, 5 Things to Know About the Celebrity Nude Photo 
Hacking Scandal, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/showbiz/hacked-nude-
photos-five-things (last updated Oct. 12, 2014) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) 
(“There’s a list of 100 celebrity women—and one man—whose photos were 
supposedly downloaded and stolen by a hacker.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 216. See Jon Fingas, Strategy Analytics: iCloud, Dropbox and Amazon Top 
Cloud Media in the US, ENGADGET (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.engadget.com/2013/03/21/strategy-analytics-cloud-media-market-
share (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (reporting that iCloud is the most widely used 
cloud storage service among consumers) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 217. See Duke, supra note 215 (noting that one actress tweeted that her 
hacked photos “were deleted long ago”). 
 218. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2347 (“Even after a user deletes his data or 
closes his account, many cloud storage providers will preserve data on their 
servers for a period of time.”). 
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terms of service clause can be considered upfront).219 That, of 
course, does not eliminate the problem.220 
B. The Peace of Mind Problem 
When the cloud storage user comes to learn that she lacks of 
control over her cloud-maintained digital property,221 what 
naturally follows is a loss of peace of mind.222 This is a problem 
because peace of mind, certainty, security—however one wishes 
to phrase it—is a fundamental aspect of property law.223 The 
right to destroy arguably exemplifies this background principle of 
property rights, as it is the only right that, if effectively exercised, 
is necessarily permanent.224 The process of deleting data from the 
cloud, however, is anything but certain.225 
Put another way, this is an issue of trust.226 As computer 
expert Ray Rafaels observes, the cloud user “relinquishes direct 
                                                                                                     
 219. See id. at 2339 (discussing cloud storage “agreements in which the 
provider retains the expressed right to access and, in some cases, use the 
information provided”). 
 220. See infra Part IV.D (discussing why a solution is needed even if cloud 
storage is utilized on a voluntary basis). 
 221. See supra Part IV.A (noting the extent to which a cloud storage 
provider maintains control over the digital property its users store in the cloud). 
 222. See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 25, at 9 (reporting that many consumers 
are “very concerned” about cloud storage providers selling or using their data 
and keeping their data after they attempt to delete it). 
 223. See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN 
THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 189–90 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 
2001) (discussing the interests “advanced by a system of property rights,” 
including peace of mind and security); Joseph William Singer, Property as the 
Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 1287, 1316 (2014) (describing “property” as a 
“stable basis of expectation” and arguing “that a property law system should 
give us . . . peace of mind”). 
 224. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (“[B]y destroying a vase, [one] 
permanently exclude[s] third parties from using it. . . . [One] do[es] not merely 
use it—[one] use[s] it up.”). 
 225.  See Gold, supra note 175, at 2347 (noting that cloud storage providers 
may retain users’ data even after the user apparently deletes them). 
 226. See RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 58 (discussing issues of trust in “the 
cloud computing paradigm”); Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 79 
(observing that “it is up to the user . . . to trust that the [cloud storage] provider 
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control over many aspects of security and, in doing so, confers a 
level of trust onto the cloud provider.”227 One way to remedy the 
problem may be by contract,228 but that is no effective cure 
because cloud storage contracts are predominantly non-
negotiable.229 Moreover, such contracts tend to be ambiguous as 
to what rights the cloud storage provider may actually exercise 
with regard to its users’ data.230 
A brief glance at a few cloud storage services will prove the 
point. We have already discussed Dropbox,231 but it bears 
repeating in the context of this problem that the language used 
by its privacy policy is elusive at best.232 JustCloud, another cloud 
storage vender, provides in its terms and conditions that it “may 
retain” data users store on its servers “for a period after [the] 
trial or license has been terminated, expired, or otherwise 
lapsed.”233 Google, a giant in this arena, assures users of Google 
Drive (a cloud storage service) that they retain all rights to their 
digital property,234 but the company’s support pages state the 
                                                                                                     
will delete her information”). 
 227. RAFAELS, supra note 152, at 58. 
 228. See id. at 58–59 (suggesting that cloud computing contracts “state 
clearly that the [user] retains ownership over all its data” and that “the cloud 
provider” may not “use the data for its own purposes”). 
 229. See Calloway, supra note 209, at 172 (noting that cloud users lack 
“sufficient bargaining power” and “are often left with a boilerplate clickwrap 
agreement”). Calloway observes that although in the past “judges either held 
[such agreements] to be unenforceable contracts of adhesion or found particular 
terms to be unconscionable,” there has been “a jurisprudential shift towards a 
willingness to enforce these contracts.” Id. at 168–69. 
 230. See infra notes 231–235 and accompanying text (discussing the vague 
language of several cloud storage providers’ respective terms of service). 
 231. Supra notes 29, 31, 219 and accompanying text. 
 232. Compare Delete Files in Dropbox, supra note 29 (instructing users on 
how to “permanently” delete their files), with Dropbox Privacy Policy, supra note 
31 (providing that there “might be some latency” before Dropbox deletes the files 
and that Dropbox “may retain” the files under certain circumstances). 
 233. JustCloud Terms and Conditions, JUSTCLOUD, http://www.justcloud. 
com/terms (emphasis added) (last updated Sept. 19, 2016) (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 234. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/ 
policies/terms/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2014) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (informing 
users of Google Drive that “what belongs to you stays yours”) (on file with the 
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“owner of the file” may contact Google “to help recover a deleted 
file or folder for a limited time.”235 Google’s policy may be born of 
good intentions, but it nevertheless begs several questions: How 
long is a limited time? Where is the data stored between deletion 
and recovery? Who can access the supposedly deleted file? More 
important, given the vague language used by Google and other 
cloud storage providers, can the cloud user be said to have any 
certainty with regard to the usage of her cloud-maintained digital 
property?  
Even if the cloud provider states unambiguously that files 
will be deleted upon command, the issue of trust is not cured 
because it is the cloud provider, not the cloud user, who is in 
control of the digital property.236 A recent case involving the video 
messaging application Snapchat exemplifies this particular 
problem.237 Briefly, Snapchat claimed that any messages sent 
using its application would be deleted within a period of time 
designated by the sender.238 Indeed, Snapchat’s own FAQ stated 
unequivocally: “[Messages] disappear after the timer runs out.”239 
Yet, according to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), this claim 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 235. Find or Recover a File, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/drive/ 
answer/2405957?hl=en (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 236. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (“Users are embracing the cloud in droves 
for good reason . . . . The flip side to this is that the cloud also translates to a 
loss of control.”). 
 237. See Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 (May 8, 
2014) 2014 WL 1993567 (alleging that Snapchat “violated the provisions of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act”). Although Snapchat is not a cloud storage 
service, it does retain unviewed messages on its own servers for “30 days.” 
SNAPCHAT, SNAPCHAT LAW ENFORCEMENT GUIDE 6 (2015), 
https://storage.googleapis.com/snap-inc/privacy/lawenforcement.pdf. In that 
sense Snapchat resembles a cloud provider. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 27 
(“In one form or another, cloud computing services store bits of information on 
behalf of their customers.”). 
 238. See Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 at 2 
(“Snapchat marketed its application as a service for sending ‘disappearing’ 
photo and video messages, declaring that the message sender ‘control[s] how 
long your friends can view your message.’”). 
 239. Id. at 3. 
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was misleading.240 There were in fact “several methods . . . by 
which a recipient [could] use tools outside of the application to 
save both photo and video messages, allowing the recipient to 
access and view the photos or videos indefinitely.”241 As a result, 
the FTC ordered Snapchat to rectify the way it represented itself 
to the public.242 
Similarly, cloud storage users have no real way of knowing 
whether their property rights are being effectively exercised.243 A 
user can command her cloud storage provider to do many things, 
including delete the digital property she has entrusted to it.244 
She cannot, however, verify that her commands have taken effect; 
she must simply have faith that her storage service has provided 
an accurate picture of the server (or servers) where the data are 
actually being stored.245 Digital property law cannot, and should 
not, rest on such opaque foundations.246 
                                                                                                     
 240. See id. at 4 (charging Snapchat with making “false or misleading” 
representations). 
 241. Id. at 3. 
 242. See Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 at 
2 (ordering that Snapchat “shall not misrepresent in any manner, expressly or 
by implication, in or affecting commerce, the extent to which . . . its products or 
services maintain and protect the privacy, security, or confidentiality of any 
covered information”) The order defined “covered information” broadly to 
include “any communications or content that is transmitted or stored through 
[Snapchat’s] products or services.” Id. 
 243. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (“A permanent deletion might make a file 
or account disappear from the user’s view, but there’s no telling what happens 
to the file behind the scenes.”). 
 244. See Secure Access Control for Cloud Storage, IBM, 
http://www.research.ibm.com/haifa/projects/storage/cloudstorage/secure_access.s
html (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (explaining how users manage their clouds) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 245. See Sheldon, supra note 202 (observing that deleted data might “still 
exist on the primary servers” or “might actually be deleted in some places, but 
still exist in others”). 
 246. The “importance of clarity in property rights” cannot be overstated. 
Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1780 n.174 
(2011). 
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C. The Need for a Solution 
At this point, one might interject—why does all this matter? 
No one, after all, is forced to use cloud storage. Digital property 
owners are merely making a tradeoff: more convenience for less 
control. Isn’t the answer to the problem to just simply forego the 
cloud altogether?  
That solution, frankly, is no solution at all. The cloud is not a 
passing fad; it is the future of data storage, a future rapidly 
encroaching upon the present.247 Furthermore, as Part III 
explained, many consumers are not even aware that they are 
participants in the cloud computing market.248 Demanding that 
consumers choose between the cloud and property rights today is 
no different than demanding consumers choose between 
telephone networks and privacy rights decades ago. In Katz v. 
United States,249 the Supreme Court clearly rejected that 
position.250 Notably, the Court emphasized “the vital role that the 
public telephone has come to play in private communication”251 
and overturned a case it decided nearly four decades earlier.252 
Perhaps the passage of time between the two cases accounted for 
the Court’s evolved view in applying old law to new technology. 
But we cannot wait decades; we have already entered the age of 
                                                                                                     
 247. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text (discussing the 
widespread and rapid adoption of cloud computing among individuals and 
businesses). Indeed, a recently released mobile device is “more tightly integrated 
with the cloud than just about any other smartphone, and the creators promise 
it will change the way we think about managing files on our tiny pocket 
computers.” Chris Velazco, Nextbit Robin Review: This Ambitious ‘Cloud Phone’ 
is Beautiful but Flawed, ENGADGET (Nov. 11, 2016), 
http://www.engadget.com/2016/02/18/ nextbit-robin-review (last visited Mar. 6, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 248. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing automatic cloud 
backup features on certain mobile devices). 
 249. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 250. See id. at 359 (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s protection from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” applied to conversations made over public 
telephones). 
 251. Id. at 352. 
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wires beyond [a person’s] house and messages while passing over them are not 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment”). 
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the cloud.253 Therefore, an actual solution—beyond simply 
abandoning cloud computing—is needed now. 
V. Reclaiming the Right to Destroy 
The problems discussed in Part IV are not limited to one 
particular context, but they tend to arise when people desire and 
make efforts to delete data that they have stored on the cloud.254 
Therefore, the answer ought to lie in reaffirming the property 
right most related to that concern: the right to destroy.255 This 
Part will lay out that solution by first explaining why we should 
recognize the right to destroy in this emerging context and, 
second, how the cloud-maintained digital property owner can 
actually exercise this right.256 It then concludes by briefly 
discussing the potential impact of the reaffirmed right to destroy 
on digital property governed by license agreements.257 
A. Why We Should 
1. Waste and Data 
Waste is by far the prevailing justification for restricting the 
right to destroy.258 The core of the argument is that because we 
live in a world of limited resources, and because the right to 
destroy permits property owners to waste these resources by 
destroying them at will, the right to destroy ought to be curtailed 
or even eliminated altogether.259 This sounds reasonable, though 
                                                                                                     
 253. See supra notes 160–163 and accompanying text (discussing the 
present ubiquity of cloud computing). 
 254. See supra Part IV.A–C (noting problems regarding control, peace of 
mind, and ethics when cloud users are unable to delete their data maintained on 
the cloud with certainty). 
 255. See supra Part II (discussing the history of the right to destroy as 
recognized by Anglo-American law). 
 256. Infra Part V.A–B. 
 257. Infra Part V.C. 
 258. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 821 (observing that “waste avoidance 
has been the primary basis for” curtailing the right to destroy). 
 259. See id. at 796 (noting that “where a living person seeks to destroy her 
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the strength of that logic would seem to be dependent on the 
uniqueness of the property.260 But proponents of this “antiwaste 
sentiment,” as well as its critics, have thus far considered the 
issue only within the context of tangible property.261 This Note 
takes another path. Digital property maintained on the cloud is 
“electronic data” and data are inherently “intangible.”262 There 
are several reasons why it does not make sense to apply the 
public policy doctrine of waste to such property. 
First, there is the chief distinction between digital property 
(but not necessarily all intangible property) and tangible 
property: replicability.263 Indeed, every cloud-maintained file is 
necessarily a copy because the cloud user has uploaded her files 
to the cloud from some local source, be it a mobile device, hard 
drive, or any other storage system.264 Thus, if the owner of a PDF 
e-book completely deletes her file, she is merely deleting her copy 
of that file. Even if her copy were one of only a few, virtually 
anyone possessing another copy of the file could probably create 
many, many copies within seconds, at zero cost.265 
                                                                                                     
property, the courts express concern about the diminution of resources available 
to society as a whole”). 
 260. This is likely why most restrictions of the right to destroy arise in the 
context of real property. See id. (observing that “the most prominent set of cases 
prompting concerns about waste involve efforts by landowners to destroy their 
homes”). 
 261. See, e.g., id. at 821–22 (defending the right to destroy tangible goods); 
McCaffery, supra note 14, at 2 (discussing “waste” as “the dissipation or 
destruction of a permanent physical asset”). 
 262. See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital 
Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 444 (2005) (noting that “electronic 
data . . . are ethereal and intangible, difficult to classify and more difficult to 
protect”). 
 263. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839–42 (discussing the 
“copying dilemma that has so hounded online property interests” and observing 
that, by contrast, “[i]t is easier to buy a table from someone than to duplicate it 
through copying”). 
 264. See supra Part III.C (discussing the mechanics of cloud storage). 
 265. See ANANDA MITRA, DIGITAL SECURITY: CYBER TERROR AND CYBER 
SECURITY 82 (2010) (noting that it is possible to “make thousands of copies of a 
file and distribute them globally for no cost”). 
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Conversely, if the owner of a paper book burns it to ashes, 
she is burning a one-of-a-kind item.266 The effect of her act, that 
is, the degree of her waste, would depend on a number of 
variables, for instance, whether it was a mass-market paperback 
or a rare first edition.267 Even if her book is one of a million 
printings, however, she has arguably engaged in waste by leaving 
the world with one less resource. Although that cost may be a 
fraction of a cent, the ledger recording society’s collective 
resources must mark a loss nonetheless—and losses add up. 
This rule is admittedly not universal. If the owner of the data 
in question is the one who created it, then its deletion could mean 
the loss of a unique resource. For instance, when a person takes a 
picture on her smartphone, the file initially exists just on that 
particular device (assuming a backup is not automatically stored 
in the cloud).268 Yet this is the exception that proves the rule: 
antiwaste thought has never gone so far as to argue the creator of 
a thing lacks the right to destroy it.269 That brings us to the 
second point: digital property stored on the cloud by individuals 
tends to be generated by the cloud user herself.270 As waste is a 
“societal concern,”271 it would be difficult to justify curtailing the 
                                                                                                     
 266. See PETER TOREN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPUTER CRIMES 
§ 1.06 (2003) (“Prior to the digitization of information, copying was possible but 
it was time-consuming, expensive, and . . . not very efficient.”); Don E. 
Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual Property on the 
Information Superhighway: The Challenge of the Digital Domain, 6 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 61, 64 (1994) (“Unlike a book, anything traveling on the information 
superhighway can be ‘perfect-copy’ captured . . . .”). 
 267. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 792–94 (noting the relationship 
between waste and value). 
 268. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing cloud storage 
services that backup users’ data automatically). 
 269. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 830–35 (discussing “strong reasons to 
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 270. See, e.g., One Thing Is Clear: People Love the Cloud, VERIZON, 
https://www.verizonwireless.com/archive/mobile-living/tech-smarts/how-people-
use-cloud-storage (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (noting that most individual cloud 
users use it for personal files such as pictures) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 271. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785. 
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right to destroy cloud-maintained data when only the digital 
property’s owner is affected by its deletion. 
Finally, it may actually be prudent to destroy digital property 
stored on the cloud. Data, as a practical matter, is difficult to 
control.272 The burglar who steals something tangible has in her 
possession nothing more than that single tangible thing. By 
contrast, the hacker who steals digital property, such as an 
embarrassing image file, could instantly upload the data to the 
internet and thereby allow thousands of copies to fall into 
thousands of proverbial hands.273 If the former theft is a single 
flame—still capable of burning, but manageable—the latter is a 
California wildfire.274 The question, then, is how to prevent this 
potential conflagration. 
There is no foolproof method. Security risks are always 
present when data and the internet collide, as with cloud 
storage.275 Nevertheless, the power to delete is an essential 
safeguard against such risks; if the owner of a cloud-maintained 
file wants to be sure that the world will never see it, her only 
option is to delete it.276 Consider the legal profession: the reason 
                                                                                                     
 272. See Gervais & Hyndman, supra note 28, at 62–64 (discussing the 
difficulty of controlling data on the internet); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234 
(“Once information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not 
impossible, to control, track, or delete.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Duke, supra note 215 (discussing a “hacker’s invasion of 
dozens of celebrity iCloud accounts, leading to the embarrassing leaking of nude 
photos”). 
 274. Some have termed this phenomenon the “Streisand effect.” See Justin 
Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Because “[t]he ease of sharing now 
almost means that nothing can really be suppressed,” attempts to suppress 
leaked photos, for example, lead to those photos being copied and shared even 
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 275. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 140 (2015) (“In any security 
situation, there’s a basic arms race between attack and defense. One side might 
have an advantage for a while . . . [but] then it changes back.”). Schneier notes 
that, at present, “both on the Internet and with computers in general, the 
attacker has the advantage.” Id. at 141. 
 276. See, e.g., How to Stop Compromising Pictures of You Being Published 
Online, DMCA, http://www.dmca.com/FAQ/How-to-stop-compromising-pictures-
of-you-being-published-online (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (instructing internet 
users to “make sure” that files are deleted to prevent them from being 
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lawyers sometimes put clients’ files through a shredder is not 
necessarily because they are obligated to do so, but because it is 
difficult to keep track of that file for a long period of time and 
thereby ensure it does not fall into improper hands.277 Similarly, 
the only way to ensure that data does not reach the wrong person 
is to delete it.278 Thus, the owner who destroys her cloud-
maintained digital property is not only not being wasteful; she is 
being vigilant. 
2. The Value of Deleting 
It is not enough to show that antiwaste policies are 
inapplicable to cloud-maintained digital property; the right to 
delete such property must have some value in itself. Professor 
Strahilevitz’s article, discussed throughout this Note, offers 
several justifications for the right to destroy generally.279 For 
example, the right to destroy incentivizes prolific figures to 
preserve their thoughts on paper280 and permits artists to engage 
                                                                                                     
“published online for all to see”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). As one expert advises: “Any data you serve up to the cloud can be 
stored out there indefinitely, no matter how hard you try to delete it, so give 
careful consideration before sending sensitive information into the void.” 
Sheldon, supra note 202. 
 277. See Jay G. Foonberg, Preservation of Files: To Destroy or Not to Destroy, 
in THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO BUYING, SELLING, MERGING, AND CLOSING A LAW 
PRACTICE 171, 171–72 (Sarina A. Butler & Richard G. Paszkiet eds., 2008) (“File 
maintenance, closing, and destruction should be part of an in-place system in 
the law practice of every lawyer. . . . Without a file closing and destruction 
system in place, the lawyer or firm becomes a permanent unpaid warehouse 
service or bailee for the file.”). 
 278. See Ash Mayfield, Comment, Decrypting the Code of Ethics: The 
Relationship Between an Attorney’s Ethical Duties and Network Security, 60 
OKLA. L. REV. 547, 600 (2007) (“Sometimes an attorney may need to 
permanently delete confidential data.”); supra note 276 and accompanying text 
(discussing the importance of data deletion). 
 279. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 808–21, 824–38 (discussing instances 
when “society” should “allow someone to remove a valuable, durable asset from 
the marketplace”). 
 280. See id. at 814 (noting that when someone “anticipates that at a later 
date he will be able to decide whether to destroy an embarrassing, revealing, or 
controversial document, he will be more likely to create and save it in the first 
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in an important form of expression.281 Moreover, in opposition to 
the criticism, Professor Strahilevitz contends that the right to 
destroy can even serve public policy, observing that “public policy 
rationales that seem plain in one era evaporate during 
another.”282 
This Note shall again take another path. The right to destroy 
is valuable because of its relationship to an owner’s control over 
her property.283 History reveals that this conception of the right is 
not entirely new.284 In Ancient Rome, for example, recognition of 
the right to destroy provided a necessary premise in the syllogism 
securing property rights, which in turn secured control over 
property.285 Likewise, the right to destroy recognized by the 
common law of England made clear that an owner’s property 
rights were absolute.286 As the issues discussed in Part IV all 
arise from an owner’s lack of control over her cloud-maintained 
data,287 it is this justification of the right to destroy that gives the 
right value in the context of cloud computing.  
                                                                                                     
place”). 
 281. See id. at 824 (“Because the destruction of a wooden cross, an American 
flag, or a draft card conveys an obvious political or social message, courts 
contemplating property destruction in the First Amendment context generally 
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 282. Id. at 799. Discussing Eyerman, Strahilevitz notes that “[a] 
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act of generosity, not capriciousness, to the modern reader.” Id. at 799–800. 
 283. See supra notes 23, 197–201 and accompanying text (discussing 
property rights as granting an owner control over property).  
 284. See supra Part II.A–B (addressing the history of the right to destroy). 
 285. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785–86 (“Under Roman 
law . . . destruction functioned as the most extreme recognized property right, so 
the owner who could destroy his property necessarily had the right to use it in 
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 286. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223–24 (explaining that “if 
a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple . . . he may commit whatever waste 
his own indiscretion may prompt him to, without being impeachable or 
accountable for it to any one”). Blackstone, as discussed, viewed English 
property rights as absolute. See supra Part II.B (discussing the right to destroy 
developed through English common law). 
 287. See supra Part IV.A (discussing an owner’s lack of control over her data 
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The power to delete serves unique purposes in the age of 
digital property.288 The right to destroy has been called “an 
extreme right to control subsequent alienation,”289 but when it 
comes to cloud-maintained data, destruction might be the only 
means of controlling subsequent alienation. Recall the 
hypothetical discussed in this Note’s introduction.290 The owner of 
a photograph can control subsequent alienation in several ways. 
By simply possessing it, she necessarily prevents others from 
possessing it.291 By keeping it in her home, she can generally 
control who uses it. By handing it to a friend, she can be sure that 
the friend receives it. Finally, by burning it, she can be sure that 
no one will ever possess it, use it, or transfer it again.292 
These methods are unavailable to the owner of a digital 
picture stored on the cloud. She may possess the file, in the sense 
that she can access it, but this does not prevent others from 
possessing it.293 Indeed, the cloud storage provider clearly 
possesses it, thereby placing “subsequent alienation” more or less 
in its hands.294 The owner may be able to set permissions as to 
                                                                                                     
maintained on the cloud). 
 288. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF 
FORGETTING (2009) (discussing the dangers of “everlasting digital memory”). 
 289. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794. 
 290. See supra notes 25–33 and accompanying text (illustrating how 
destroying a tangible photograph differs from deleting a digital picture, which in 
turn differs from attempting to delete a digital picture maintained on the cloud). 
 291. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 864–65 (“If person A holds 
a rivalrous resource, person B does not.”). Although not universally so, 
“traditional personal property” is both “rival and tangible.” Id. at 865. 
 292. Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (noting that “by destroying [property], 
I permanently exclude third parties from using it . . . . I use it up . . . [and] 
prevent it from ever being resold or used in a manner that displeases [me]”). 
 293. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2334 (“Cloud account holders can share 
their materials with other account holders, and more than one person can use 
the same account from different locations.”) 
 294. See, e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple. 
com/legal/internet-services/icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2017) (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017) (providing that “Apple may, without liability to you, access, 
use, preserve and/or disclose your Account information and Content to law 
enforcement authorities, government officials, and/or a third party, as Apple 
believes is reasonably necessary or appropriate”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). Apple defines “Content” broadly to include “music, 
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who can access the file on the cloud,295 but she cannot ensure 
these commands will be heeded.296 In other words, while the 
owner of the tangible photograph can simply hand it over to a 
friend, the owner of the cloud-maintained digital picture must 
ask the cloud storage service to give her friend access and at the 
same time trust the service to not grant access to any other. What 
was once a straightforward transaction becomes roundabout in 
the world of the cloud. 
That is why the right to destroy is valuable. If recognized, 
and properly enforced,297 the right will allow the cloud user to 
fully control her data, because destruction is unequivocal; 
actually deleting digital property is the same as actually 
destroying tangible property.298 It is true that the nature of cloud 
computing makes it difficult for the owner of digital property to 
govern who can access it, possess it, and use it.299 With respect to 
such property, however, the right to destroy can not only evince 
the existence of these less extreme property rights,300 but secure 
them as well.301 
The right to destroy is also necessary to secure an 
ever-increasing concern of the twenty-first century: privacy.302 
                                                                                                     
graphics, photographs, images, sounds, videos, [and] messages.” Id. 
 295. See Gold, supra note 175, at 2334 (discussing how cloud users can share 
their files with others). 
 296. See supra notes 211–214 and accompanying text (discussing the cloud 
user’s lack of control over her cloud-maintained data and specifically an 
instance where “Dropbox mishandled access permissions to files stored on its 
servers”). 
 297. See infra Part V.B (explaining how we can reaffirm the right to 
destroy). 
 298. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing methods of effective deleting electronic 
data). 
 299. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 202, at 295–96 (including the uncertainty 
of “ownership and control of online data” among “concerns that create barriers 
to wider acceptance of cloud computing”). 
 300. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 788 (discussing the view that if an 
owner has “the right to destroy property, he certainly [has] the right to use or 
dispose of it in a less dramatic manner”). 
 301. See supra notes 272–278 and accompanying text (explaining why cloud 
users must have the ability to delete data as a matter of prudence). 
 302. See SCHNEIER, supra note 275, at 125–34 (discussing the dangers of 
“mass surveillance . . . being done by algorithms”); Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 
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Destruction, after all, is the ultimate security measure.303 
Shredders do not exist because people enjoy seeing paper 
transformed to confetti; they exist because people need a way to 
ensure that written information remains private.304 In that 
respect, digital property is no different. As a data security tool, 
the power to delete is critical because it is the best means of 
ensuring data remain private.305 
B. How We Can 
1. Securing the Right 
Although the law may disfavor the right to destroy, the right 
itself is not dead; yet, it lives merely as an implicit right.306 This 
is not an ideal state of things with respect to the cloud, which is 
itself plagued by uncertainty.307 After all, property rights hold 
                                                                                                     
786 (noting that “protecting the right to destroy can enhance social welfare by 
protecting privacy”). 
 303. See, e.g., Mayfield, supra note 278, at 573 (noting that “an attorney 
must shred files that contain confidential information before they are deposited 
in the trash”); Beth Givens, Prevent Identity Theft with Responsible 
Information-Handling Practices in the Workplace, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE 
(Mar. 1, 2004), https://www.privacyrights.org/blog/prevent-identity-theft-
responsible-information-handling-practices-workplace (last updated June 2009) 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (discussing the importance of ensuring destruction to 
data privacy and security) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 304. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 813 (noting that “presidents and other 
public officials” do not destroy their private papers “irrationally,” but “to protect 
their privacy and the privacy of their associates”). 
 305. See, e.g., MICROSOFT, PROTECTING DATA AND PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD 10 
(2014), http://goo.gl/WbJFT2 (noting that data are deleted so “customers’ data 
privacy is maintained”); Secure Deletion Guideline, U.C. BERKELEY, 
http://security.berkeley.edu/secure-deletion-guideline (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) 
(“Resource Custodians must ensure [the deletion of files because] . . . [s]torage 
media are prone to physical theft and loss [and u]nauthorized parties can 
acquire unencrypted data stored on the device.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 306. See supra Part II.D (discussing the present state of the right to 
destroy). 
 307. See supra notes 202–206, 225–230 and accompanying text (observing 
the cloud user’s lack of control and the ambivalence of cloud storage terms of 
service agreements). 
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little meaning unless they are “secured by clear laws.”308 The 
right to destroy must thus be both acknowledged and explicitly 
recognized by the law if owners are to regain control of their 
cloud-maintained digital property. 
Property rights, generally speaking, are creatures of common 
law.309 An owner does not acquire a “bundle of rights” in her 
property by statute.310 Indeed, possessing, using, excluding, and 
transferring property are so bound up with the idea of ownership 
that it is difficult imagining an Anglo-American system of 
property without those rights.311 In that sense, the right to 
destroy is a bit of an anomaly. Many courts consider it a less 
important right and some have not hesitated to restrict it.312 
Legal commentators, meanwhile, attack the right while leaving 
the others in the bundle unscathed.313 Furthermore, the long 
history of the right does not change the fact that property owners 
rarely destroy their valuable property.314 The product of these 
factors is that courts may be more inclined to eschew common law 
tradition when it comes to the right to destroy.315 
                                                                                                     
 308. Property Rights, 2017 INDEX ECON. FREEDOM, 
http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 309. See, e.g., Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. 
L. REV. 247, 248 (2007) (“Common law principles are the primary source of 
property law.”). 
 310. See id. at 257 (discussing “the bundle of rights and the common law 
property rules that make up the bundle in each state”). 
 311. See id. at 268 (noting that property rights “are so much a part of the 
American psyche” that “[t]hese rights have been bound up with the preservation 
of private property and landed interests from the revolution forward”). 
 312. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing cases limiting the right to destroy). 
 313. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that Black’s Law 
Dictionary removed references to the right to destroy from its definition of 
“owner,” but retained “the right[s] to possess, use, and convey something”); 
supra Part II.C.2 (discussing scholarly works advocating for limitations of the 
right to destroy). 
 314. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 (observing that owners destroy 
valuable property rarely and that even though “[l]ess valuable kinds of property 
are destroyed all the time, . . . the low stakes involved . . . keep any resulting 
disagreements out of the courts”). 
 315. See id. at 852 (concluding that “[t]he recent trend in American law has 
been to curtail property owners’ traditional rights to destroy their own 
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However, the caselaw limiting the right to destroy concerns 
tangible, usually real property;316 scholarly condemnation of the 
right to destroy arises predominantly in the context of waste;317 
and the (attempted) deletion of data is far more commonplace 
than the destruction of property in the physical world.318 Courts 
should acknowledge that digital property maintained in the cloud 
falls outside the scope of the classic right to destroy 
jurisprudence319 and accordingly construe precedents restricting 
the right to destroy narrowly. They should then look towards the 
common law, where they will find the long recognized right to 
destroy.320 The concept of cloud storage may be new, but the right 
to destroy is not.321 As this Note has made clear, the truth is 
quite the opposite.322 Courts would thus be fully justified in 
relying on a traditional right derived from the common law to 
solve this twenty-first century problem.  
The best feature of this solution is that it is both simple and 
readily implementable.323 Courts, as discussed above, need only 
consult the long history of the right to destroy, recognize that 
precedents restricting it are inapplicable to data stored on the 
cloud, and, accordingly, affirm that the owner of cloud-
maintained digital property has the right to delete it. Although 
                                                                                                     
property”). 
 316. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the common contexts of right to 
destroy cases). 
 317. See supra Parts II.C.2, V.A.1 (noting that waste avoidance is the 
“prevailing justification” for efforts to limit the right to destroy). 
 318. Compare supra notes 272–278 and accompanying text (discussing why 
owners ought to destroy digital property), with Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 794 
(noting that a property owner is not likely to want to destroy her valuable 
property).  
 319. See supra Part V.A.1 (arguing that waste concerns are far less 
pronounced in the digital property context).  
 320. See Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 783 (observing that the right to 
destroy is “a long-recognized right of property owners”). 
 321. See id. at 787–88 (discussing the right to destroy “in antiquity”). 
 322. See supra Part II.A (tracing the early history of the right to destroy). 
 323. See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts: The Contractual 
Governance of Virtual Worlds, 53 MCGILL L.J. 427, 466 (2008) [hereinafter 
Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts] (noting that “the common law is an 
immediately available tool to solve problems related to emerging technologies”). 
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there do not seem to be any instances of courts ordering 
destruction for the purpose of respecting an owner’s right to 
destroy her property,324 courts frequently order the destruction of 
property, as well as the deletion of intangibles, in other 
contexts.325 Moreover, as Chief Justice Marshall famously stated 
over two centuries ago, “it is a general and indisputable rule that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or 
action at law whenever that right is invaded.”326 What is a 
property right if not a legal right? 
The alternative solution would be to secure the right by 
statute.327 It is true that a positive law that spells out in clear 
terms (1) that owners of cloud-maintained digital property have 
the right to delete their data and (2) what cloud providers must 
do to ensure its deletion would definitively secure the right 
discussed above. Indeed, in the best of worlds, such a statute 
would be a good thing. But there are a number of difficulties with 
this approach. 
First, it is not readily implementable.328 If we were to rely 
solely on statutory law, cloud users seeking to ensure the 
destruction of their cloud-maintained digital property would be 
without recourse until such a time as when the statute is 
enacted. Hence, the second disadvantage: the lawmaking process 
                                                                                                     
 324. This should not be surprising, given that ownership rights and 
possession of the property have historically gone hand in hand. See, e.g., O.W. 
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 241 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2005) (“The 
consequences attached to possession are substantially those attached to 
ownership . . . .”). Thus the owner could readily exercise her right to destroy 
without the need for judicial recourse. 
 325. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 395 
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Defendant [shall] destroy all copies of Plaintiffs’ Recordings 
that Defendant has downloaded onto any computer hard drive or server without 
Plaintiffs’ authorization and destroy all copies of those downloaded recordings 
transferred onto any physical medium or device in Defendant’s possession, 
custody, or control.”). 
 326. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
 327. See Johnson, supra note 309, at 248 (“Property law comes from three 
sources: the common law, statutes, and the Constitution.”). 
 328. See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 323, at 465–68 
(discussing the comparative advantages of common law over law legislatures 
develop). 
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is sluggish.329 Years, if not decades, could go by before cloud users 
obtain the right to delete cloud-maintained data. Finally, it is 
unclear what the statute would actually look like. One can only 
imagine the series of debates regarding the purpose, scope, and 
enforcement of this hypothetical law.330 Perhaps we could look 
internationally for inspiration, where the concept of a “right to 
delete” has gained much traction in the data-privacy context.331 
This idea, however, has apparently fallen on deaf ears in the 
United States; it “is the only Western country without basic data 
protection laws.”332 Moreover, legislatures have historically been 
unreliable in the field of digital property.333 If Congress has yet to 
act in these arenas, can it really be expected to act when it comes 
to the right to delete cloud-maintained data? 
This is not to say a statute enshrining the right to destroy 
cloud-maintained data is unwanted. Quite the contrary, a 
congressional enactment would clearly cement the legitimacy of 
the common law right to destroy. But, for better or worse, we “live 
in a common law regime.”334 A statute, therefore, is not needed. 
Anglo-American law once recognized the right to destroy as 
fundamental335 and it should do the same today. Once courts, for 
the reasons noted above, recognize the right to destroy in the new 
context of cloud-maintained digital property, cloud users will 
finally be able to wrest control over their data from the hands of 
cloud providers. 
                                                                                                     
 329. See Gary Lawson, Judicial Supremacy Today: Interpretative Equality 
as a Structural Imperative (Or “Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. 
COMMENT. 379, 382 (2003) (“The lawmaking process is slow, cumbersome, and 
difficult.”). 
 330. See Fairfield, Anti-Social Contracts, supra note 323, at 466–67 (noting 
that “technology legislation is infamous for creating unforeseen consequences” 
and that such legislation “is often sweeping”). 
 331. See SCHNEIER, supra note 275, at 200–03 (discussing the data 
protection laws of the European Union). 
 332. Id. at 200. 
 333. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1091–92 (discussing 
why “there is little reason to think that the United States will reach an effective 
legislative solution to the virtual property problem”). 
 334. Id. at 1091. 
 335. See supra Part II.B (discussing the right to destroy at common law). 
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2. Enforcing the Right 
It is one thing to secure the right to destroy by law; it is 
another to be able to actually execute that right. The chief 
impediment in that respect is the sheer resiliency of data.336 In 
other words, the question is whether cloud-maintained digital 
property is even capable of deletion. Strictly speaking, the answer 
is no.337 As observed at the outset of this Note, the only way to 
absolutely guarantee the destruction of a file is to destroy the 
physical device containing it.338 Physical destruction, however, is 
no solution for the cloud user. After all, the servers do not belong 
to her in the first place.339 It would be patently unreasonable to 
demand that Google, for example, smash one of its servers to bits 
to ensure the deletion of another’s file taking up a tiny fraction of 
the server’s space. Therefore, we must define “destroy” more 
broadly to encompass the effective deletion of data. 
One method of effectively deleting data is by overwriting 
it.340 In fact, data cannot even be considered deleted unless it is 
overwritten because simply deleting a file “just makes the file 
                                                                                                     
 336. See NAT’L COMPUT. SEC. CTR., A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING DATA 
REMANENCE IN AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 1 (1991), 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=A
DA393188 (noting that “[d]ata remanence is the residual physical 
representation of data that has been in some way erased” and discussing “the 
role data remanence plays when storage media is erased”). 
 337. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 26, at 46 (“Deleting files is so difficult that 
only extreme measures may work.”); McGillivray, supra note 21, at 234 (“Once 
information is uploaded to the cloud, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, 
to control, track, or delete.”). 
 338. See Krause, supra note 26, at 46 (quoting an expert as stating that 
“[t]he only way to completely erase a hard drive is to take it out of the computer 
and smash it with a hammer”). 
 339. See Sandeen, supra note 148, at 14 (recognizing that using the cloud 
entails using “the database storage facilities of a third party”); supra Part III.C 
(providing an overview of cloud storage). 
 340. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., http://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-delete-your-data-securely-
windows (last updated Mar. 5, 2015) (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“The best way to 
delete a file forever . . . is to make sure it gets overwritten immediately, in a way 
that makes it difficult to retrieve what used to be written there.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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invisible” and marks the space it once occupied as available.341 
Overwriting a file may not guarantee its obliteration,342 but it is 
generally accepted that overwritten data cannot be recovered.343 
Thus, to ensure the destruction of cloud-maintained digital 
property, cloud providers should immediately overwrite data 
marked for deletion with new or even existing data. Given the 
sheer volume of data stored on the cloud,344 this should not be a 
problem. 
There is a problem, however, in that overwriting is only 
effective for traditional, magnetic-based storage like hard disk 
drives (HDDs).345 Today, most companies operating server 
farms—such as cloud storage providers—have upgraded to solid-
state drives (SSDs), which are based on flash memory.346 There 
                                                                                                     
 341. Id. 
 342. See Daniel Feenberg, Can Intelligence Agencies Read Overwritten 
Data?, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (July 21, 2003), http://www.nber.org/sys-
admin/overwritten-data-gutmann.html (last modified Mar. 24, 2004) (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017) (acknowledging “that overwritten bits might be observable 
under certain circumstances”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 343. See id. (arguing that overwritten data are generally inaccessible); 
RICHARD KISSEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA 
SANITIZATION 7 (2014), 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-88r1.pdf 
(reporting that “a single overwrite . . . typically hinders recovery of data even if 
state of the art laboratory techniques are applied to attempt to retrieve the 
data”). 
 344. See CISCO, CISCO GLOBAL CLOUD INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 
2015–2020, at 13 (2015), http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/
service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.pdf (reporting 
“per-user traffic” of cloud storage at “513 MB per month in 2015” and 
forecasting “1.7 Gigabytes (GB) per month by 2020”). 
 345. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340 
(providing instructions on how to overwrite data, but noting that the 
instructions “apply only to traditional disk drives”). 
 346. See Cade Metz, Flash Drives Replace Disks at Amazon, Face-Book, 
Dropbox, WIRED (June 13, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/flash-
data-centers (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (“Dropbox is running servers equipped 
with solid-state drives . . . . Such names as Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft, 
Mozilla, and Wikia are also using solid-state storage in their data centers, and 
judging from anecdotal evidence, the trend goes even further.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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are numerous distinctions between HDDs and SSDs,347 but 
relevant here is the fact that overwriting does little to secure the 
deletion of data stored on the latter kind of device.348 As a result, 
“it is difficult, if not impossible, to securely delete both individual 
files and free space” from SSDs.349 
So is the right to delete digital property stored in the cloud a 
moot point? Not at all. Data stored on solid-state drives can still 
be effectively deleted through encryption.350 This approach entails 
using “a cryptographic key to encrypt and decrypt incoming and 
outgoing data”351 and deleting the key to “effectively sanitiz[e] the 
data by preventing read-access.”352 In other words, the digital 
files are locked and can only be accessed through a key; throw 
away the key and they are essentially rendered inaccessible.353 
Then they can be overwritten or otherwise deleted with little 
worry.354 Even if the files have not truly vanished, they cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 347. See, e.g., Brendan Hesse, Solid State Drives vs. Hard Drives: Which Is 
Right for You?, DIGITAL TRENDS (June 26, 2015), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20160304083634/http://www.digitaltrends.com/comp
uting/solid-state-drives-vs-hard-disk-drives (last visited Mar. 5, 2017) 
(discussing the “pros and cons of both technologies”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 348. See MICHAEL WEI ET AL., RELIABLY ERASING DATA FROM FLASH-BASED 
SOLID STATE DRIVES 1 (2011), https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/fast11/tech/ 
full_papers/Wei.pdf (“Single-file sanitization [or data erasing] 
techniques . . . consistently fail to remove data from the SSD.”). Although 
“overwriting the entire disk twice [is] sufficient to sanitize the disk,” id. at 6, for 
obvious reasons cloud storage providers cannot be required to overwrite an 
entire solid-state drive to conform with a cloud user’s request to delete her data, 
which will typically take up a small fraction of it. 
 349. How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340; see also 
WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 7 (“None of the [single-file overwriting] protocols 
tested successfully sanitized the SSDs or the USB drive in all cases.”). 
 350. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 2 (“An alternative approach to 
overwriting or otherwise obliterating bits is to cryptographically sanitize 
storage.”). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Kissel et al., supra note 343, at 9. 
 353. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 6 (“[D]eleting the encryption key will, 
in theory, render the data on the drive irretrievable.”). 
 354. See How to: Delete Your Data Securely on Windows, supra note 340 
(observing that “even if the file is still on the disk, it will at least look like 
gibberish to anyone who gets ahold of it”). 
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accessed and thus cannot be used, alienated, or controlled in any 
meaningful sense, assuaging the concerns underlying the right to 
destroy.355 Although this method is not foolproof,356 it is the best 
means available to cloud users seeking to properly enforce their 
legal right to delete digital property stored on the cloud.357 
C. One Caveat: The Trouble with Terms 
Up until this point we have discussed the right to destroy 
digital property with the assumption that the one seeking to 
exercise that right owns the property. But as a result of long, 
complex, and almost universally unread agreements, much of 
what we consider to be “our” digital property—from eBooks to 
MP3s to video games—is not sold to us, but licensed.358 
One subset of such licensed digital property that might be 
called virtual property best demonstrates this “terms of use” 
problem.359 Such property may only “exist” within a specific 
virtual world, but there are nevertheless markets wherein the 
virtual property can be exchanged for real-world money.360 This is 
despite the fact it is almost universally the creator of the virtual 
                                                                                                     
 355. See supra notes 23, 200 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between the right to destroy and an owner’s control over her 
property). 
 356. See WEI ET AL., supra note 348, at 6 (noting the disadvantages of 
sanitizing data through encryption and concluding that “it is unduly optimistic 
to assume that SSD vendors will properly sanitize the key store”). 
 357. See supra Part V.A (arguing that the right to destroy should encompass 
the right to delete cloud-maintained data). 
 358. See Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 839 (observing that 
“[p]roperty rights in digital copies of copyrighted material” are typically subject 
to “end user license agreements”); Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: 
Amazon “Kindles” the Copy Ownership Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 149, 
162 n.68 (2010) (noting that Amazon Kindle “license terms prevent buyers from 
actually owning [e-]books” and discussing the bevy of restrictions and terms 
found in the “iTunes EULA”). 
 359. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1050 (arguing that 
“holders of intellectual property rights have been systematically eliminating 
emerging virtual property rights by the use of contracts”). 
 360. See id. at 1061 (“Within virtual environments, virtual objects of all 
types change hands for real money.”). 
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world, as opposed to the individual who buys, sells, trades, and 
uses the virtual property, who owns the virtual property.361 
Therein lies the rub: if we simply reaffirm and reinforce the right 
to destroy in the current digital landscape,362 those who use, 
trade, buy, and sell various virtual assets will be unprotected 
from the actual owner of the property’s exercise of the right. Is 
there any way to avoid this pitfall?  
This leads us to an issue every discussion of the right to 
destroy must inevitably address: whether the right should be 
absolute. Even the most ardent defenders of the right to destroy, 
however, do not argue for an absolute right.363 This Note is no 
exception. Although waste is of little concern in the digital 
property context,364 for the reasons discussed above, the right to 
destroy ought to be limited with respect to digital property 
secured through licensing agreements.365 
This caveat to the solution offered in Part V.B can likewise 
be achieved through the common law.366 Courts should recognize 
a new public policy exception for the right to destroy with respect 
to virtual property. This would not be unprecedented.367 Courts 
limiting the right to destroy have typically done so on the basis of 
how the destruction of a particular piece of property would affect 
                                                                                                     
 361. See id. at 1063 (“Although hundreds of millions of dollars change hands 
annually for virtual houses, chairs, money, clothes, or the like, . . . rights in 
virtual property are either not enforced, or are expressly prohibited by the 
creator of the virtual environment, who holds the intellectual property interest 
in the environment itself.”). 
 362. See supra Part V.A–B (arguing why and how courts should recognize 
the right to destroy).  
 363. See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 9, at 785, 796–803 (concluding that 
“the right to destroy should [not] be absolute” and “identify[ing] a few contexts 
and considerations in which restrictions on the destruction of property are 
highly desirable”). 
 364. Supra Part V.A.1. 
 365. For simplicity and brevity, this Note will refer to such property as 
“virtual property.” 
 366. See supra notes 323–335 and accompanying text (arguing for a common 
law solution to the problem of being unable to reliably delete cloud-maintained 
digital property).  
 367. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing caselaw exceptions to the right to 
destroy). 
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someone other than the owner.368 That is exactly the basis for 
this proposed exception. In the case of virtual property, a virtual 
world provider that deletes the virtual property it holds 
intellectual rights to is far less affected by that act than the user 
of the virtual property who has potentially invested time, money, 
or even other virtual goods into it.369 While sweeping limitations 
on the right to destroy ought to be generally discouraged, when 
ownership becomes a “strange amalgam[] of contract, licensing, 
and pseudoproperty law,”370 the right must be more carefully 
construed. 
VI. Conclusion 
Today, most of us are digital property owners, whether we 
make movies with our Samsung Galaxy or dictate notes to Siri or 
simply take “selfies” on the latest smart device. Tomorrow, cloud 
storage will be the primary—if not default—way we maintain 
such property. This is not a bad thing in itself. The convenience of 
being able to access our videos, writings, photographs, and other 
kinds of digital property no matter where we are or what 
equipment we are using is nothing short of amazing. But even if 
technology marches on, that is no reason to let property rights 
fall by the wayside. We cannot allow a fundamental underpinning 
of property ownership—control—to be swept up in the cloud.  
The severance of control from possession is a uniquely 
modern problem stemming from what seems like a perfect storm 
of technological developments. Yet, somewhat ironically, it 
highlights the advantages of our old but adaptable common law 
system. As proposed by this Note, we can solve this problem by 
affirmatively reaffirming and reinforcing the right to destroy. As 
the foregoing discussion makes clear, this solution is both 
                                                                                                     
 368. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1975) (refusing to enforce a testator’s will provision to raze her house because 
“[d]estruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally affects the 
community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the estate and is 
without benefit to the dead woman”). 
 369. See Fairfield, Virtual Property, supra note 133, at 1062 (observing “the 
amount of current investment and interest in virtual worlds”). 
 370. Fairfield, Bitproperty, supra note 127, at 810. 
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desirable and feasible. All that is required is to implement it. By 
doing so, owners of digital property maintained in the cloud will 
be able to exert the same rights property law promises to owners 
of tangible property existing in the real world. 
The right to destroy is not just an ancient concept or a relic of 
common law to be tossed aside in favor of a more “enlightened” 
framework of property.371 It is a right newly relevant, and wholly 
adaptable, to the modern system of digital property. It can and 
should become the right to delete—the right to disperse the cloud. 
                                                                                                     
 371. Cf. McCaffery, supra note 14, at 81 (referring to the right to destroy as 
“an embarrassment in Anglo-American law”). 
